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Abstract
Consumers make mistakes. Imperfect information and imperfect rationality lead to misperception 
of benefi ts and costs associated with a product. As a result, consumers might fail to maximise 
their preferences in product choice or product use. A proposed taxonomy of consumer mistakes 
draws attention to a less-studied category of mistakes: use-pattern mistakes – mistakes about 
how the consumer will use the product. Use-pattern mistakes are prevalent. Sellers respond 
strategically to use-pattern mistakes by redesigning their products, contracts and pricing schemes. 
These strategic design responses often exacerbate the welfare costs associated with consumer 
mistakes. From a policy perspective, focusing on disclosure regulation, the importance of use-
pattern mistakes requires more, and better, use-pattern disclosure. In particular, sellers should be 
required to provide individualised use-pattern information.
1 Introduction
Consumers make mistakes. Imperfect information and imperfect rationality lead to 
misperception of benefi ts and costs associated with a product. As a result, consumers 
might fail to maximise their preferences in product choice or product use. In this article, 
we offer a taxonomy of consumer mistakes, drawing attention to a less-studied category 
of mistakes: use-pattern mistakes. We argue that use-pattern mistakes are prevalent. 
Sellers respond strategically to use-pattern mistakes by redesigning their products, 
contracts and pricing schemes. These strategic design responses often exacerbate the 
welfare costs associated with consumer mistakes. From a policy perspective, focusing 
on disclosure regulation, we argue that the importance of use-pattern mistakes requires 
more, and better, use-pattern disclosure.
 We begin, in Part 2, by distinguishing between two categories of information – 
information about product attributes and information about product use.1 For example, 
the interest rate on a credit card and the penalty for late payment are attributes of the 
credit card product. Borrowing patterns and the incidence of late payment describe 
how the product is used. The total benefi ts and costs associated with a product are a 
function of both product attributes and use patterns. Total interest paid depends both 
on the interest rate and on the consumer’s evolving balance. Total penalty charges 
depend both on the late fee and on the frequency of late payment. The important role of 
information has been recognised both in the economic analysis of consumer markets and 
in consumer protection law. To a large degree, however, both the law and the economics 
of consumer markets have focused on information about product attributes. This article 
emphasises the importance of product use information or lack thereof in explaining 
market behaviour and in effectively regulating consumer markets.
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1 Product attributes affect product use. How a consumer uses a product depends on the product’s 
functionality and on the product’s price – both product attributes.
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 The relevance of consumer mistakes – descriptively, normatively and prescriptively – 
depends on the robustness and persistence of these mistakes in a market setting. A naïve 
view would dismiss mistakes based on imperfect use information as short-lived or even 
non-existent. Product use depends on consumer wants and needs, and consumers are 
supposed to know their own wants and needs. The ideal homo oeconomicus consumer 
has perfect information about his preferences. But his real-world counterpart does not. 
Moreover, product use depends on external infl uences as well as on internal preferences. 
Accordingly, even the ideal, perfectly rational consumer might suffer from imperfect 
use information.
 After describing the two main subjects of consumer mistakes – product attributes 
and product use – we proceed, in Part 3, to consider regulatory responses to such 
market failure. In particular, we consider disclosure regulation. We focus on disclosure 
regulation for several reasons. First, disclosure is the most benign form of intervention, 
facilitating, rather than inhibiting, the operation of markets.2 Second, and related, 
disclosure mandates have proven to be the most politically feasible, often the only 
politically feasible, form of regulation in many contexts.3 Finally, this article studies 
the problem of consumer mistakes. Since mistakes can often be traced back to lack 
of information, disclosure of information is the natural starting point for solving the 
mistake problem. This does not mean that disclosure is a perfect fi x in all mistake cases. 
Nor does it mean that disclosure is always superior to other forms of regulation or to 
no regulation at all. The costs and limits of information disclosure are well known. 
Our goal is not to idealise disclosure. Rather, recognising the prevalence of disclosure 
regulation, our goal is to help regulators design more effective disclosure mandates. 
We argue that disclosure requirements should match the type of information defi cit that 
caused the market failure. When market failure is caused by mistakes about product 
attributes, the solution is disclosure of product attributes. And when market failure is 
caused by mistakes about product use, the solution is disclosure of use patterns.
 A brief survey of existing disclosure requirements demonstrates the prevalence of 
disclosure mandates focused on product attributes. Use-pattern disclosure requirements 
are more limited and less effective. Consumers receive information on the proper use 
of products. For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in the United States, 
as well as parallel agencies in several European states, require clothes manufacturers 
to provide information on how to properly clean the clothes.4 Consumers also receive 
indirect use information when product attribute information is based – explicitly or 
implicitly – on some assumption about average or typical use. For example, a cigarette’s 
tar and nicotine ratings, which are certifi ed by the FTC, assume a certain intensity of 
smoking – a 2-second, 35-millilitre puff every minute.5 We argue for enhanced use-
pattern disclosure. In particular, we argue for direct disclosure of average use-pattern 
information. For example, credit card issuers can be required to disclose the average 
likelihood of paying late (and triggering a penalty fee) or, even better, the amount that 
an average consumer pays in late fees each year. More importantly, we argue that in 
certain markets sellers should be required to provide individual-use information. 
Elaborating on the previous example, credit card issuers can be required to tell each 
consumer how much he or she paid in late fees over the past year. This prescription is 
feasible and desirable in markets, such as the credit card market, where sellers maintain 
long-term relationships with their customers and thus voluntarily collect individual-use 
information.
 The call for enhanced use-pattern disclosure, and specifi cally the emphasis on 
individual-use disclosure, challenges the conventional wisdom about information and 
2 See C. Camerer et al., ‘Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics and the Case for 
“Asymmetric Paternalism”’ (2003) 151 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1211; C.R. Sunstein and R.H. Thaler, ‘Libertarian 
Paternalism is not an Oxymoron’ (2003) 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159.
3 See e.g. O. Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Plastic’ (2004) 98 NW. U. L. Rev. 1373 at 1374, n. 3 (describing 
the failed attempts to enact usury ceilings for credit cards and the resort to disclosure regulation); R.J. 
Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth and Regulation of Payment Card Markets (2006) at 159 (describing 
disclosure mandates as ‘a common compromise solution in the American regulatory regime’).
4 See below Section 3.1. However, there is no such regulation at the European level. Id.
5 See below Section 3.2.
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disclosure in consumer markets. This conventional wisdom recognises that sellers often 
have superior product attribute information and that it may be desirable to require them 
to disclose this information to consumers. On the other hand, the conventional wisdom 
largely overlooks the welfare-enhancing potential of use-pattern disclosure, because it 
assumes that consumers, not sellers, have superior use-pattern information. We argue 
that this assumption, while clearly true in some markets, is false in others. In important 
consumer markets, sellers know more about the consumers’ use patterns than the 
consumers themselves. In these markets, use-pattern disclosure may well be desirable.6
 Finally, disclosure mandates can be more important when the subject of the 
mandate is use-pattern information. Sellers have strong incentives to voluntarily 
disclose product attribute information. By disclosing this seller-specifi c information, 
high-quality sellers can convince consumers to buy from them, rather than from a 
low-quality competitor. (And since only low-quality sellers remain silent, consumers 
will be able to easily identify the low-quality sellers.) Voluntary disclosure of 
use-pattern information is less likely. Since the information is consumer-specifi c, 
not seller-specifi c, if one seller discloses the use-pattern information, the now-
informed consumer may well purchase the product from a different seller. 
When voluntary disclosure is less reliable, the case for disclosure mandates becomes 
stronger.
 We focus on mandatory disclosure as the prototypical autonomy-enhancing, 
minimally paternalistic regulatory technique. But our analysis also questions whether 
disclosure mandates are as benign as they are believed to be. First, the notion of informing 
consumers about themselves smacks of paternalism. Second, and more important, our 
analysis highlights the complex set of regulatory design choices that result in a mandatory 
disclosure rule. Since imperfectly rational consumers cannot process endless amounts of 
information, optimal disclosure rules must carefully pick what information is disclosed 
and what information remains undisclosed (or what information is emphasised and what 
information is de-emphasised). In effect, the regulator must decide what information is 
more important for consumers and what information is less important for consumers. 
Even with disclosure, some measure of paternalism cannot be avoided.
2 The Object of Consumer Mistakes: Two Categories
This article is about mistakes, specifi cally, consumer mistakes affecting product choice 
and product use. A mistake can be the result of imperfect information or imperfect 
rationality. Why do consumers have only imperfect information? Why and in what 
way do consumers deviate from the perfect rationality ideal? These are all important 
questions – important questions that are largely sidestepped in this article. Rather, our 
goal is to conceptualise and categorise mistakes, in Part 2, and to study regulatory 
responses to mistakes, in Part 3.
2.1 Two Categories of Consumer Mistakes
Informed choice assumes two distinct categories of information: information about 
product attributes and information about how the product will be used. One way to view 
the distinction between product-attributes information and product use information is 
by tracing the source of the information. Product attribute information, like the product 
itself, is created by the manufacturer. The manufacturer is the source of the information. 
Product use is a function of both the product’s attributes and the consumer’s wants and 
needs. Product-use information has two sources – the manufacturer and the consumer. 
A different categorisation would focus on these two sources and distinguish between 
manufacturer (or seller) information and consumer information. Consumer information, 
6 While the conventional wisdom, and the regulatory landscape that is based on it, focus on product 
attribute disclosure, there are important examples of use-pattern disclosures, including direct average-use 
disclosures and individual-use disclosures, both in existing law and in law reform proposals. See below Part 
3. These examples, however, serve as the exception that proves the rule.
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i.e. information on consumer wants and needs, can be further divided into two categories 
or sources of information: an internal source, consisting of consumer preferences, and 
an external source, consisting of the sum of external forces that affect the benefi t to the 
consumer from using the product.
 Consumer protection law is concerned with imperfect information on the part 
of consumers. Traditional consumer protection analysis and policy focus on lack of 
information about product attributes.7 This emphasis on product attribute information 
can be traced back to the rational choice foundations of traditional consumer protection 
analysis. Rational choice theory assumes that individuals have perfect information about 
their own preferences. To the extent that use is determined by consumer preferences, the 
rational choice model assumes perfect information about use patterns. Unfortunately, 
few consumers are perfectly rational. And imperfectly rational consumers might have 
imperfect information concerning their own preferences.8 Moreover, as explained 
above, how a consumer will use a product depends on external infl uences as well as 
on internal preferences. Even a perfectly rational consumer may have only imperfect 
information about these external infl uences.
 Consider a lawnmower. The value of a lawnmower to a consumer depends on 
attributes of the lawnmower and on how frequently the consumer will want or need 
to mow his or her lawn. How often the lawnmower will be used depends, in turn, 
on attributes of the lawnmower, on consumer preferences and on external factors 
infl uencing the consumer’s need to mow the lawn. The attributes of the lawnmower 
matter, for example, because, a better lawnmower is less burdensome to operate and 
thus will be used more often. Consumer preferences matter, because a consumer who 
cares more about his or her lawn will use the lawnmower more often. And external 
forces, like rainfall and soil condition, matter, because they affect the speed with which 
grass grows. To make a fully-informed decision whether to purchase a lawnmower and 
which lawnmower to purchase the consumer must have information on all of these 
factors. Yet consumer protection law, with its focus on product attribute information, 
pays insuffi cient attention to other factors affecting product use.
 Or consider a credit card. Focusing on the fi nancing component of the credit card 
product, the value of a credit card depends on product attributes, specifi cally the interest 
rate. The value of the product also depends on how it will be used – on how much 
the consumer will borrow. The extent of borrowing, in turn, depends on: (1) product 
attributes such as the interest rate; (2) the consumer’s intertemporal consumption 
preferences; and (3) external forces affecting the consumer’s desire to borrow or need 
to borrow, such as present and expected available income and conditions affecting the 
demand for funds, e.g. illness or divorce. Policy-makers have been concerned about 
mistakes in the credit card market. Their response, however, has largely been targeted 
at product attribute information. The Truth in Lending Act, for example, mandates 
conspicuous disclosure of credit card interest rates. Use-pattern mistakes that are not 
caused by imperfect information about interest rates have received less attention.9
2.2 The Persistence of Use-Pattern Mistakes
Many consumer mistakes are short-lived. Consumers quickly learn to avoid these 
mistakes and market forces work to eliminate them. Accordingly, consumer mistakes 
are important, descriptively and normatively, only if they can withstand these mistake-
correction forces. The persistence of any mistake, including use-pattern mistakes, is an 
7 See below Part 3.
8 We are assuming that consumers have fi xed preferences, but might be imperfectly aware of these 
preferences at the time when they decide whether to buy a certain product or which type of product to buy. 
Our departure from the neoclassical model is thus limited. A more substantial departure would recognise 
that some preferences are not fi xed, but rather constructed, and that information, including information 
provided by sellers, affects the construction of preferences. Relaxing the fi xed-preferences assumption 
raises important descriptive and normative questions; questions which we do not address in this article.
9 See below Part 3.
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empirical question.10 A market-specifi c inquiry is necessary to determine whether the 
specifi c market is affl icted by a mistake-driven market failure. But before we turn to 
empirics, we offer several observations on the theoretical possibility of persistent use-
pattern mistakes. We argue that learning, an important mistake-correction force, might 
be weaker in the use-pattern context. We then argue that another mistake-correction 
force, education efforts by sellers, might also be less effective in curing use-pattern 
mistakes. 
2.2.1 Learning by Consumers
Use-pattern mistakes are based on misperception about product attributes as well as 
about the consumer’s own wants and needs. Learning about internal factors infl uencing 
a consumer’s wants and needs – about preferences – should be easy and quick. Learning 
about external factors, namely product attributes and external forces infl uencing the 
consumer’s wants and needs, can be more or less effective depending on context.11 But 
there are general forces working against learning of use-pattern information. Learning 
can be both intrapersonal and interpersonal. In many markets, interpersonal learning 
is an important safeguard against persistent consumer mistakes. And interpersonal 
learning is less effective in curing use-pattern mistakes.12
 Interpersonal learning is quick and effective when the object of learning is a 
standardised product.13 But not all products are standardised. And when the product 
is not standardised interpersonal learning becomes slower. With a standardised good, 
when a consumer discovers, through use, a certain hidden feature of the product, he or 
she can share this information with family and friends. Since the information pertains 
to a standardised good it is relevant to others. But if the good is not a standardised good 
such interpersonal learning will be less effective. With a non-standardised good the 
information obtained by one consumer might not be relevant to another consumer who 
purchased a different version of the non-standard good.14 
 When the nature of the product is more broadly defi ned to include the potential uses 
of the product, then the group of standardised products shrinks. In particular, even an 
otherwise standardised product is non-standardised with respect to use patterns, when 
different consumers use the product in different ways. And this can inhibit learning of 
use-pattern information. After using a product for some time, a consumer will obtain 
valuable use-pattern information. But this information, while valuable to this specifi c 
consumer, may be of little value to another consumer who will use the same product 
differently.15
10 See A. Tversky and D. Kahneman, ‘Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions’ in R.M. Hogarth 
and M.W. Reder (eds.), Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology (1987) at 91 
(‘The claim that the market can be trusted to correct the effect of individual irrationalities cannot be made 
without supporting evidence.’).
11 Learning from one’s mistakes relies on timely, clear and painful feedback that the decision was in fact a 
mistake. See C. Camerer, ‘Comments on “Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk Regulation”, 
by R. Noll and J. Krier’ (1990) 19 J. Legal Stud. 791 at 794 (learning occurs when the outcome is prompt 
and unambiguous); R. Korobkin, ‘Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability’ 
(2003) 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203 (citing references). An impediment to learning is that people attribute good 
outcomes to skill and bad outcomes to (bad) luck. See J. Arlen, ‘Comment: The Future of Behavioral 
Economic Analysis of Law’ (1998) 52 Vand. L. Rev. 1765 at 1783 (citing M. Bazerman, Judgment in 
Managerial Decision Making (1998)). On the limits of learning, see generally Tversky and Kahneman, 
above note 10, at 90-91; H. Latin, ‘“Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations’ (1994) 
41 UCLA L. Rev. 1193 at 1252-1255. Generally, infrequent mistakes or mistakes that generate infrequent 
feedback are less susceptible to correction by learning.
12 Learning – both intrapersonal learning and interpersonal learning – can occur within markets and across 
markets. Some use-pattern mistakes transcend market boundaries and are more amenable to cross-market 
learning than product attribute mistakes.
13 See e.g. R.A. Epstein, ‘Behavioral Economics: Human Error and Market Corrections’ (2006) 73 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 111 at 120 (arguing that mistakes with respect to the value of a standardised product are unlikely to 
persist in the marketplace).
14 See O. Bar-Gill, ‘The Behavioral Economics of Consumer Contracts’ (2008) 92 Minn. L. Rev. 749.
15 This is not to say that meaningful information cannot be conveyed. For example, one consumer can 
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 An important factor that facilitates learning is seller reputation. Seller reputation is 
commonly based on the quality of the seller’s product, not on how consumers use the 
product. Accordingly, reputation, as facilitator of consumer learning, plays a smaller 
role in the learning of use-pattern information. Another form of learning is based on 
expert advice. Consumers, recognising their imperfect rationality and the imperfect 
information at their disposal, take steps to limit the mistakes that they make. In particular, 
consumers seek advice and consult experts before entering the market.16 This indirect 
form of learning is also less effective when product use information is concerned. 
Experts and other advice-providers can assist the consumer by providing information 
about typical uses of the product, but they generally do not have information about an 
individual consumer’s expected use patterns.
2.2.2 Correction by Sellers
In addition to learning by consumers, sellers may invest in correcting consumer 
misperceptions.17 Consider the following, arguably common, scenario. Seller A offers 
a product that is better and costs more to produce than the product offered by seller B. 
Consumers, however, underestimate the added value from seller A’s product and thus 
refuse to pay the higher price that seller A charges. In this scenario, seller A has a powerful 
incentive to educate consumers about its product – to correct their underestimation 
of the product’s value. Underestimation of value is often the product of a use-pattern 
mistake. For example, consumers who underestimate the intensity with which they will 
use a product will underestimate the value of a higher-quality, more resilient product. 
Accordingly, seller A will want to correct consumers’ use-pattern mistake.
 But what if both seller A and seller B and many other sellers offer identical low-
quality products? If seller A increases the quality of its product and invests in correcting 
the use-pattern mistake that led consumers to undervalue high-quality products, then 
seller A will attract a lot of business and make a supra-competitive profi t. But this is not 
an equilibrium. After seller A invests in consumer education, all the other sellers will 
free ride on seller A’s efforts. They will similarly increase quality and compete away any 
profi t that seller A would have made. Anticipating such a response, seller A will realise 
that, if it invests in consumer education, it will not be able to recoup its investment. It 
will thus choose not to increase the quality of its product, and instead will continue to 
offer a low-quality product. This collective action problem can lead to the persistence 
of consumer misperception.18 
indicate to another: ‘This is a good printer if you don’t print more than 100 pages a month, otherwise it is 
expensive.’ This information is useful to consumers with different use patterns. Interpersonal learning about 
use-pattern information is plausible if the ‘teacher’ conveys generic information that the ‘learner’ can adapt 
to his or her own circumstances.
16 See e.g. R.A. Epstein, ‘Second-Order Rationality’ in E.J. McCaffery and J. Slemrod (eds.), Behavioral 
Public Finance (2006) 355 at 361-362.
17 See e.g. Epstein, above note 13, at 120. The line between consumer learning and seller advertising is not 
always clear. Sellers can and do infl uence information transmission between consumers (word-of-mouth). 
See D.B. Godes and D. Mayzlin, ‘Firm-Created Word-of-Mouth Communication: A Field-Based Quasi-
Experiment’ (2004) Harvard Business School Marketing Research Paper No. 04-03.
18 See H. Beales, R. Craswell and Steven Salop, ‘The Effi cient Regulation of Consumer Information’ 
(1981) 24 J.L. and Econ. 491 at 527 (explaining why sellers might not disclose both positive and negative 
information). See also R. Ted Cruz and J.J. Hinck, ‘Not My Brother’s Keeper: The Inability of the Informed 
Minority to Correct for Imperfect Information’ (1996) 47 Hastings L.J. 635 at 659. In some markets, the 
fi rst-mover advantage will be large enough to overcome the collective action problem. Branding and product 
differentiation can also reduce the collective action problem. See Epstein, above note 13, at 120. But see 
Bar-Gill, above note 14, at § I.B. (identifying the limits of Epstein’s branding and differentiation argument). 
In this sense, monopoly power, including limited monopoly power conferred by patent or trademark, by 
geographic proximity and so forth, can facilitate mistake correction by reducing the collective action 
problem. See Beales, Craswell and Salop, see above, at 503-509, for a general discussion of information 
failures in consumer markets. On the limits of advertising as a mistake-correction mechanism, see also 
X. Gabaix and D. Laibson, ‘Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in 
Competitive Markets’ (2006) 121 Q. J. Econ. 505; Korobkin, above note 11, at 1242-1243.
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 Even apart from this collective action problem, sellers might prefer not to correct 
consumer mistakes and might even invest in creating misperception. Arguably, 
manipulation of consumer perceptions, and even preferences, is a main purpose of 
advertising.19 For example, to increase demand for their product, sellers will often try to 
persuade consumers that they will use a product more than they actually will. Therefore, 
while competing sellers may often choose to educate consumers, this mistake-correction 
force is limited.
 Moreover, use-pattern mistakes are less susceptible to correction as compared to 
product attribute mistakes. Sellers have a powerful incentive to correct product attribute 
mistakes, and specifi cally to undo any underestimation of product quality, because these 
product attribute mistakes hurt the seller’s reputation and thus adversely affect not only 
the demand for this one product but also the demand for the seller’s other products. 
Since use-pattern mistakes do not have a similar effect on the seller’s reputation, the 
incentive to correct such mistakes is weaker.
 Finally, and most importantly, while sellers have powerful incentives to voluntarily 
disclose product attribute information, they do not have similar incentives to disclose 
product use information. First, consider the case of product attribute information. 
Rational but uninformed consumers, facing different sellers offering products of varying 
quality, would be willing to pay for only average quality. A seller with an above-average 
product would thus have a strong incentive to disclose the quality of its product (product 
attribute information). But this is not the end of the story. Since all above-average sellers 
disclose the quality of their products, consumers would know that any seller who remains 
silent is in the bottom half of the quality distribution. Consumers who face a silent 
seller would thus be willing to pay for only average quality in the bottom half of the 
quality distribution. A bottom-half seller whose product exceeds the average quality in 
the bottom half of the quality distribution would thus have a strong incentive to disclose 
the quality of its product. Now consumers would know that any seller who remains 
silent is in the bottom quarter of the quality distribution. This dynamic of disclosure 
and inference continues until all sellers, except for the lowest quality seller, disclose the 
quality of their products.20
 Such voluntary disclosure is less likely with respect to product use information. 
Product-attribute information is seller-specifi c. Sellers disclose this information to 
attract buyers, by demonstrating that their product is superior to what their competitors 
are offering. Product-use information, on the other hand, is consumer-specifi c, at least in 
part. If a seller discloses product use information, there is no guarantee that the consumer 
will purchase the product from the disclosing seller. As long as the disclosed use patterns 
are common to the entire product category, i.e., they are not seller-specifi c, the now-
informed consumer may just as well purchase the product from a non-disclosing seller. 
Accordingly, sellers have little reason to voluntarily disclose use-pattern information. 
The standard argument for voluntary disclosure of product attribute information does 
not extend to product use information.21
3 Disclosure Regulation
Consumer mistakes are costly. Sellers’ response to these mistakes often increases their 
cost. An identifi cation of a market failure, here a behavioural market failure, opens 
19 See E.L. Glaeser, ‘Psychology and the Market’ (2004) 94 Am. Econ. Rev. Papers and Proceedings 408 
at 409-411 (‘Markets do not eliminate (and often exacerbate) irrationality. … The advertising industry is 
the most important economic example of these systematic attempts to mislead, where suppliers attempt to 
convince buyers that their products will yield remarkable benefi ts. … It is certainly not true that competition 
ensures that false beliefs will be dissipated. Indeed in many cases competition will work to increase the 
supply of these falsehoods.’). Glaeser argues, however, that government decision-makers have weaker 
incentives than consumers to overcome errors, and thus intervention in markets might make things worse. 
Id. See also E.L. Glaeser, ‘Paternalism and Psychology’ (2006) 73 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133.
20 See S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart, ‘Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids’ (1980) 35 J. of Fin. 323.
21 See O. Bar-Gill and O. Board, ‘Product Use Information and the Limits of Voluntary Disclosure’ 
(unpublished manuscript).
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the door to the possibility of welfare-enhancing legal intervention. In many markets 
the primary form of regulation is disclosure mandates. Disclosure is preferred because 
it does not constrain market forces. Instead it facilitates the effi cient operation of 
markets.22 Disclosure mandates are perhaps the most widely used tool for regulating 
consumer products and contracts. Disclosure regulations are promulgated at both the 
federal and state levels. And disclosure requirements are based on both statutory law 
and common law.
 Product attribute information features prominently in the vast landscape of disclosure 
regulation. A comprehensive survey of product attribute disclosure mandates is beyond 
the scope of this article. Yet even a few examples demonstrate the range of product attribute 
information that is subject to disclosure mandates. Starting with price information, the 
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) requires disclosure of interest rates and fees by lenders,23 
and the same is true under EU law.24 TILA also mandates transparent disclosure of 
different price components as well as total price in consumer lease contracts.25 Parallel 
legislation, the Truth in Savings Act, requires depository institutions to disclose fees 
and other terms concerning deposit accounts.26 And regulations promulgated by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission require disclosure of mutual fund fees,27 as does 
a very recent Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Alternative Investment Fund Managers.28 Mandated disclosure of price information is 
not limited to fi nancial services. For example, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
requires disclosure of closing costs in real estate transactions.29 And the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) requires various price disclosures in its Funeral Industry Practices 
Rule.30
 Moving on to product quality information, FTC trade regulations require gasoline 
stations to post octane ratings of gasoline,31 sellers of insulation to disclose the 
effectiveness of the insulation,32 sellers of home amplifi ers to disclose the power output 
of the amplifi er,33 and the list goes on.34 The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, 
enforced by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), directs that food labels list 
information concerning twelve of the most important nutrients.35 The FDA also regulates 
drug labelling.36 For example, labels of non-prescription, over-the-counter (OTC) drugs 
22 Yet disclosure is not without cost. See below Section 3.6.
23 15 United States Code [hereinafter U.S.C] § 1601 et seq.; 12 Code of Federal Regulations [hereinafter 
C.F.R] § 226.
24 See Art. 5(1)(l) of EP and Council Directive 2008/48/EC, OJ L 133/66.
25 12 C.F.R. § 213. See also Press Release, Federal Reserve, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/
boarddocs/press/boardacts/1996/19960927/default.htm> (last visited 27 September 1996).
26 12 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq.; 12 C.F.R. § 230 (2000).
27 Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment 
Companies, Exchange Act Release, 33-8393, 34-49333, IC-26372, File No. S7-51-02, 17 C.F.R. §§ 210, 
239, 249, 270 and 274; RIN 3235-AG64, 2004 SEC LEXIS 474.
28 See Art. 20(1)(h) of the EP and Council Proposal for a Directive of 30 April 2009, COM (2009) 207 
fi nal.
29 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617; HUD, RESPA, available at: <http://www.hud.gov/offi ces/hsg/sfh/res/respa_
hm.cfm> (last visited 8 August 2007).
30 16 C.F.R § 453 (especially § 453.2). See also Federal Trade Commission, Facts for Business: Complying 
with the Funeral Rule (2004), available at: <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/adv/bus05.shtm>.
31 16 C.F.R. § 306.10.
32 Id., at §§ 460.13-460.14.
33 Id., § 432.
34 For an exhaustive list of the disclosure rules that the FTC enforces, see P.C. Ward, Federal Trade 
Commission: Law, Practice and Procedure (2006). The FTC is also engaged in negative disclosure 
regulation, working to prevent disclosure of false or misleading information. The FTC has general authority 
to police unfair or deceptive acts or practices. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58. It 
also has authority under specifi c statutes such as the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act, which regulates 
health claims on food labels and in food product advertising. 21 U.S.C. § 301; 21 C.F.R. § 101. See also: 
<http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/label.html> (last visited 12 March 2010). The FTC regulates food advertising, 
while the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is responsible for food labelling. See Working Agreement 
Between the FTC and FDA, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) P 9851 (1971).
35 21 U.S.C. § 301; 21 C.F.R. § 101. See also: <http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/label.html>.
36 21 U.S.C. § 352 (n); 21 C.F.R. § 201 (prescription drugs); 21 C.F.R. § 201.66 (non-prescription drugs). 
The FDA supervises labelling of both prescription and non-prescription drugs. With respect to advertising, 
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must provide information on active ingredients and on the purposes and uses of the 
drug.37 The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act, enforced by the National 
Highway Traffi c Safety Administration, requires car dealers to disclose information about 
a vehicle’s damage susceptibility, crashworthiness and ease of diagnosis and repair.38 
And the courts, enforcing contract law doctrine, require disclosure of material facts 
about any contractual transaction.39 Contract law also provides incentives for disclosure 
of contract terms,40 which, given the collapse of the product-contract distinction,41 are 
also considered quality information.42
 In Europe, too, disclosure of product quality information is required in many contexts. 
For example, pursuant to EU law, food labels must provide product quality information 
to consumers,43 including mandatory front-of-pack nutrition information.44 EU law also 
regulates drug labelling, requiring, for instance, that the packaging contain a statement 
of the active substances expressed qualitatively and quantitatively per dosage unit or 
the FDA has the authority to supervise advertising for prescri ption drugs, while the FTC supervises non-
prescription drug marketing. See Memora ndum of Understanding Between Federal Trade Commission and 
the Food and Drug Administration, 36 Fed. Reg. 18539 (16 September 1971).
37 21 C.F.R. § 201.66. See also FDA Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, ‘OTC Labeling: Questions 
and Answers’, available at: <http://www.fda.gov/cder/otc/label/quesanswers.htm> (last visited 8 August 
2007).
38 15 U.S.C. §§ 1901-2012.
39 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161b (1981) (unilateral mistake doctrine). See also R. 
Craswell, ‘Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and 
Elsewhere’ (2006) 92 Va. L. Rev. 565 at 575 (discussing the duty to disclose product attributes and contract 
terms); M.A. Eisenberg, ‘Disclosure in Contract Law’ (2003) 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1645.
40 In particular, unconscionability doctrine provides an indirect incentive for sellers to inform consumers 
about contract terms. See Beales, Craswell and Salop, above note 18, at 493-494. See also Craswell, above 
note 39, at 575 (discussing the duty to disclosure product attributes and contract terms.); Eisenberg, above 
note 39. In insurance law, the ‘reasonable expectations’ doctrine provides insurers with an incentive to 
disclose policy terms to consumers. See e.g. R.E. Keeton, ‘Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy 
Provisions’ (1970) 83 Harv. L. Rev. 961 at 968; D. Schwarcz, ‘A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial 
Regulation of Insurance Policies’ (2007) 48 Wm. and Mary L. Rev. 1389 at 1395.
41 See A.A. Leff, ‘Contract as Thing’ (1970) 19 Am. U. L. Rev. 131, 144-151 and 155; L.A. Kornhauser, 
‘Unconscionability in Standard Forms’ (1976) 64 Cal. L. Rev. 1151; D.G. Baird, ‘The Boilerplate Puzzle’ 
(2006) 104 Mich. L. Rev. 933.
42 See also Magnuson-Moss Consumer Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (requiring a seller or 
manufacturer who provides a written express warranty to properly disclose warranty or service contract 
terms). In addition, both federal and state law facilitates the meaningful disclosure of certain contract terms, 
especially warranty and liability-related terms, by requiring that they be conspicuously disclosed. See e.g. 
15 U.S.C. § 2303 (consumer product warranties must be labelled conspicuously); Uniform Commercial 
Code § 2-316(2) (any disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantability must be conspicuously 
disclosed); New York Personal Property Law § 335.1 (liability of an automobile lessee for the total loss 
of a vehicle must be conspicuously disclosed). See also J. Sovern, ‘Toward a New Model of Consumer 
Protection’ (2006) 47 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1635 at 1688.
43 See most recently the EP and Council Proposal for a Regulation of 30 January 2008, COM (2008) 
40 fi nal; see also EP and Council Directive 2000/13/EC, OJ 2000 L 109/29 (Corrigendum to Directive 
2000/13/EC, OJ 2000 L 124/66) as amended by EP and Council Directive 2003/89/EC, OJ 2003 L 308/15, 
and Commission Directive 2001/101/EC, OJ 2001 L 310/19, and Council Directive 2006/107/EC, OJ 
2006 L 363/411, and Commission Directive 2006/142/EC, OJ 206 L 368/110, and Commission Directive 
2007/68/EC, OJ 2007 L 310/11, and EP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1332/2008, OJ 2008 L 354/7; 
Commission Directive 87/250/EEC, OJ 1987 L 113/57; Council Directive of 14 June 1989, OJ 1989 L 
186/21, as amended by Council Directive 91/238/EEC, OJ 1991 L 107/50, and Council Directive 92/11/
EEC, OJ 1992 L 65/32; Commission Directive 94/54/EC, OJ 1994 L 300/14, as amended by Council 
Directive 96/21/EC, OJ 1996 L 88/5; EP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1829/2003, OJ 2003 L 268/1, 
as amended by Commission Regulation (EC) No. 1981/2006, OJ 2006 L 368/99, and EP and Council 
Regulation (EC) No. 298/2008, OJ 2008 L 97/64; EP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1830/2003, OJ 2003 
L 311/1.
44 Apart from some of the provisions contained in the statutory material referred to in the previous note, 
see Council Directive 90/496/EEC, OJ 1990 L 276/40, as amended by EP and Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 1882/2003, OJ 2003 L 284/1, and by the Commission Directive 2003/120/EC, OJ 2003 L 333/51, 
and Commission Directive 2008/100/EC, OJ 2008 L 285/9 (making nutrition labelling mandatory where 
a nutrition claim appears on labelling, in presentation or in advertising, with the exclusion of generic 
advertising).
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according to the form of administration for a given volume or weight.45 Also, like in the 
United States, disclosure of material facts relating to certain transactions is required in 
Europe, too.46 In effect, this duty to disclose constitutes a core principle47 of European 
contract law, as recently acknowledged by the drafters of the 2009 Draft Common 
Frame of Reference, which states that 
[b]efore the conclusion of a contract for the supply of goods, other assets or services by a business to 
another person, the business has a duty to disclose to the other person such information concerning the 
goods, other assets or services to be supplied as the other person can reasonably expect, taking into account 
the standards of quality and performance which would be normal under the circumstances.48 
Finally, like US law, European law as well provides incentives for disclosure of contract 
terms.49
 The quality dimension that is most often subject to disclosure regulation is product 
risk. The Federal Hazardous Substances Act requires that certain hazardous household 
products bear cautionary labelling to alert consumers to the potential hazards that those 
products present.50 FDA regulations require that OTC drug labels include warnings 
about possible side-effects and other risks associated with the use of the drug.51 
Under regulations promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and 
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), sellers, landlords and 
agents must disclose the use of lead-based paint on the property and provide purchasers 
and tenants with an EPA-approved lead hazard information pamphlet.52 And tort law, 
through its ‘duty to warn’, provides strong incentives for the disclosure of product risk 
information. In particular, the failure to provide a reasonable warning about a product 
risk is considered a product defect that might trigger tort liability. 53
45 See e.g. EP and Council Directive 2001/83/EC, OJ 2001 L 311/67.
46 See e.g. Council Directive 85/577/EEC, OJ 1985 L 372/31; Council Directive 90/314/EEC, OJ 1990 
L 158/59; EP and Council Directive 94/47/EC, OJ 1994 L 280/83 (recently amended by EP and Council 
Directive 2008/122/EC, OJ 2009 L 33/10, which set forth information duties as well); EP and Council 
Directive 97/7/EC, OJ 1997 L 144/19, as amended by EP and Council Directive 2002/65/EC, OJ 2002 
L 271/16, and EP and Council Directive 2005/29/EC, OJ 2005 L 149/22, and EP and Council Directive 
2007/64/EC, OJ 2007 L 319/1;  EP and Council Directive 98/6/EC, OJ 1998 L 80/27; EP and Council 
Directive 2008/48/EC, OJ 2008 L 133/66.
47 See e.g. P. Giliker, ‘Regulating Contracting Behaviour: The Duty to Disclose in English and French 
Law’ (2005) European Review of Private Law 621 at 622-623.
48 Draft Common Frame of Reference, Chapter II.-3:101(1) (2009). See also EP and Council Proposal for 
a Directive of 8 October 2008, COM (2008) 614 fi nal (Chapters II and III).
49 See e.g. Council Directive 85/577/EEC, OJ L 372/31; EP and Council Directive 1999/44/EC, OJ L 
171/12; Directive 2008/48/EC, OJ 2008 L 133/66; EP and Council Proposal for a Directive of 8 October 
2008, COM (2008) 614 fi nal.
50 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278; 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1512. See also U.S. Consumer Products Safety Commission, 
Federal Hazardous Substances Act, available at: <http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/fhsa.html> (last visited 12 
March 2010). Among the disclosures that such labels must include are: the name and business address of 
the manufacturer, packer, distributor or seller; the common or usual or chemical name of each hazardous 
ingredient; the signal word ‘Danger’ for products that are corrosive, extremely fl ammable or highly toxic; 
the signal word ‘Caution’ or ‘Warning’ for all other hazardous products; an affi rmative statement of the 
principal hazard or hazards that the product presents, for example, ‘Flammable’, ‘Harmful if Swallowed’, 
‘Causes Burns’, ‘Vapor Harmful’, etc.; the word ‘Poison’ for a product that is highly toxic, in addition to 
the signal word ‘Danger’. See Offi ce of Compliance, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Requirements 
under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act: Labeling and Banning Requirements for Chemicals and Other 
Hazardous Substances (2002) at 3, available at: <http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/regsumfhsa.pdf>.
51 21 C.F.R. § 201.66 (c) (warnings for non-prescription drugs, including side-effects).
52 See Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2681-2692, 4851-4856; 
Requirements for Disclosure of Known Lead-Based Paint and/or Lead-Based Paint Hazards in Housing, 24 
C.F.R. § 35, 40 C.F.R. § 745. See also Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2686.
53 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 2 (1998); W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and 
Keeton on the Law of Torts (1988) at 96; Craswell, above note 39, at 566; J.A. Henderson, Jr. and A.D. 
Twerski, ‘Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn’ (1990) 65 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 265; Latin, above note 11; J.D. Hanson and D.A. Kysar, ‘Taking Behaviorism Seriously: The Problem 
of Market Manipulation’ (1999) 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev 630. Accordingly, the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability instructs sellers to ‘provide reasonable instructions and warnings about risks of injury 
posed by products’. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 2, cmt. i (1998). See also Liriano 
v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264 (1999).
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 In Europe, one of the most famous examples of required product risk disclosure 
relates to tobacco products. Pursuant to EU law, the use of warnings (both a general 
one – ‘smoke kills/can kill’ – and an additional one that must cover no less than 40% 
of the external surface of the packet) is compulsory.54 Of course, many more examples 
can be given. The packaging of paints or varnishes containing lead in quantities above 
a certain amount must disclose that the paints and varnishes contain lead.55 Similarly, 
the packaging of medicinal products must provide product risk information, such as 
information regarding the product’s effects on the ability to drive and to use machines.56
 The preceding examples demonstrate the prevalence of product attribute disclosures. 
Information about product attributes is clearly valuable. It is important to know what 
APR is charged on a credit card balance. It is important to know that orange juice 
contains vitamin C. And it is important to know that the paint in an apartment contains 
lead. With most products, however, the benefi t or cost to a consumer from any product 
attribute depends on how the consumer will use the product. The APR on a credit card is 
more important for consumers who borrow more. Drinking orange juice is a good source 
of vitamin C, but only if the juice is consumed soon after the container is fi rst opened. 
And lead paint is especially dangerous when chewed on by toddlers. Accordingly, if 
consumers make mistakes not only with regard to product attributes but also with regard 
to product use, it is important to provide use-pattern information in addition to product 
attribute information.
 While many disclosure mandates focus on product attribute information, product use 
disclosure is not absent from the current regulatory scheme. Still, current use-pattern 
disclosures are insuffi cient – both in quantity and in quality. We begin by surveying 
existing use-pattern disclosure mandates in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Existing product use 
disclosures fall into two categories: (1) proper-use disclosures; and (2) average-use 
information that is indirectly disclosed as a benchmark for product attribute disclosures. 
This survey of existing product use disclosures highlights the limits of the current 
regulatory scheme. We respond to these limits by advocating improved use-pattern 
disclosure. In Section 3.3, we argue for direct average-use disclosures. And, more 
importantly, in Section 3.4, we argue for the disclosure of individualised use-pattern 
information. After arguing that use-pattern information should be disclosed, we turn in 
Section 3.5 to the regulatory design question: how should use-pattern information be 
disclosed? Finally, Section 3.6 recalls the main costs and limits of disclosure regulation. 
The limited effi cacy of disclosure and the costs of disclosure regulation caution against 
a broad expansion of the disclosure landscape. We do not argue for more disclosure. 
Rather, we argue for a more balanced division of disclosure mandates between product 
attribute information and use-pattern information and for better-designed use-pattern 
disclosures.57
3.1 Proper-Use Information
Use information is provided through disclosures that specify the proper use of a 
product. The Consumer Products Safety Commission (CPSC) has general authority to 
promulgate ‘requirements that a consumer product be marked with or accompanied 
by clear and adequate warnings or instructions’.58 The purpose of this provision is 
to provide information on how to use the product properly. Under this authority, the 
54 See EP and Council Directive 2001/37/EC, OJ 2001 L 194/26.
55 See Commission Directive 2006/8/EC, OJ 2006 L 19/12.
56 See EP and Council Directive 2001/83/EC, OJ 2001 L 311/67.
57 An important question that we do not address in this article is the question of who should be entrusted 
with designing and enforcing disclosure regulations. One of us begins to address this question in the context 
of consumer credit products in O. Bar-Gill and E. Warren, ‘Making Credit Safer’ (2008) 157 U. PA. L. Rev. 
1 (arguing that regulation of consumer credit markets, including disclosure regulation, should be entrusted 
to a federal administrative agency). See also A. Schwartz and L. Wilde, ‘Intervening in Markets on the 
Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis’ (1979) 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630, 678-682 
(arguing that administrative agencies are better suited than courts to address the market failure); Craswell, 
above note 39, at 700 (same); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Mihollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568-569 (1980).
58 15 U.S.C. § 2056 (emphasis added).
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CPSC has issued regulations requiring the disclosure of proper-use information for 
numerous products.59 For example, sellers of bicycle helmets must provide instructions 
telling riders how to make sure the helmet fi ts properly and how to wear it properly.60 
Sellers of television antennas must provide instructions on how to avoid the hazard of 
electrocution during the installation of the antenna.61 And sellers of bunk beds must 
provide instructions for safe use, including: ‘Do not allow children under 6 years of 
age to use the upper bunk’; ‘Use guardrails on both sides of the upper bunk’; ‘Prohibit 
horseplay on or under beds’; ‘Prohibit more than one person on upper bunk’; and ‘Use 
ladder for entering or leaving upper bunk’.62
 The CPSC-enforced, Federal Hazardous Substances Act provides another example. 
The Act requires that certain hazardous household products bear cautionary labelling 
to alert consumers to the potential hazards that those products present and to inform 
them of the measures they need to take to protect themselves from those hazards.63 
Specifi cally, such labels must include the following disclosures: precautionary 
statements telling users what they must do or what actions they must avoid to protect 
themselves; instructions for fi rst aid treatment to perform in the event that the product 
injures someone; if a product requires special care in handling or storage, instructions 
for consumers to follow in order to protect themselves; and the statement ‘Keep out of 
the reach of children’.64
 The FTC, in its trade regulations, also requires disclosure of proper-use information. 
For example, the FTC requires clothing manufacturers to provide information on 
proper care.65 The FDA requires disclosure of proper-use information on drug labels. In 
particular, drug manufacturers must provide dosage and other proper-use information 
for non-prescription drugs.66 Moving on to real estate, the EPA and HUD require 
sellers, landlords and agents to provide purchasers and tenants with an EPA-approved 
lead hazard information pamphlet, which contains proper-use information on ways to 
minimise lead-based paint hazards.67
59 Beyond the examples provided below, CPSC regulations are listed on the CPSC’s website, available at: 
<http://www.cpsc.gov/cgi-bin/regs.aspx> (last visited 12 March 2010).
60 See Offi ce of Compliance, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Requirements for Bicycle Helmets 
(2002) at 4, available at: <http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/regsumbicyclehelmets.pdf>.
61 16 C.F.R. § 1402 (§ 1402.1 describes the scope of the regulation; §1402.4 requires the disclosure of 
a specifi c warning: ‘Warning: Installation of this Product Near Powerlines is Dangerous. For Your Safety, 
Follow the Installation Directions.’).
62 See CPSR Safety Standard for Bunk Beds, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1213, 1500, 1513. See also Offi ce of 
Compliance, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Safety Standard for Bunk Beds (2001) at 2, available 
at: <http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/regsumbunkbed.pdf>.
63 15 U.S.C. §§ 1261-1278; 16 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1512. See also CPSC, Federal Hazardous Substances Act, 
available at: <http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/fhsa.html> (last visited 8 August 2007).
64 See Offi ce of Compliance, Consumer Product Safety Commission, Requirements under the Federal 
Hazardous Substances Act: Labeling and Banning Requirements for Chemicals and Other Hazardous 
Substances (2002) at 3, available at: <http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/regsumfhsa.pdf>.
65 FTC Trade Regulation Rule: Care Labeling of Textile Wearing Apparel, 16 C.F.R. § 423 (1980). See 
also EP and Council Working document on the proposal for a regulation of 8 April 2009, COM (2009) 31 
fi nal (stating that ‘[t]here is currently no EU-wide legislation on care labeling, i.e. information on washing 
and ironing conditions’. But noting that ‘[s]ome Member States have introduced national provisions for 
compulsory care labelling’, and that ‘most manufacturers include this kind of information on the label of 
the textile product on a voluntary basis’).
66 21 U.S.C. § 352 (n); 21 C.F.R. § 201.66 (c). See also Food and Drug Administration, Drug Interactions: 
What You Should Know (2004), available at: <http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/ResourcesForYou/ucm163354.
htm> (‘The “Directions” section of the [over-the-counter drug] label tells you: the length of time and the 
amount of the product that you may safely use’ and ‘any special instructions on how to use the product’). 
For general information on the regulation of over-the-counter drugs, see: <http://www.fda.gov/cder/offi ces/
otc/default.htm> (last visited 12 March 2010)). Disclosure of dosage and other proper-use information is 
also required on prescription drug labels. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.5. See also FDA Requirements on Content 
and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 21 C.F.R. §§ 201, 314, 601. 
But this information is mainly for healthcare professionals, not consumers.
67 HUD Requirements for Disclosure of Known Lead-Based Paint and/or Lead-Based Paint Hazards upon 
Sale or Lease of Residential Property, 24 C.F.R. § 35.8; EPA Requirements on Lead-Based Poisoning 
Prevention in Certain Residential Structures, 40 C.F.R. § 745; EPA, ‘Protect Your Family from Lead in Your 
Home’, available at: <http://www.epa.gov/lead/pubs/leadpdfe.pdf> (last visited 12 March 2010).
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 And tort law, through its ‘duty to warn’, provides strong incentives for the disclosure 
of proper-use information. As mentioned above, the failure to provide reasonable 
instructions and warnings is considered a product defect.68 And on the fl ip side, 
adequate warnings often provide an effective shield against liability.69 The subject of 
these instructions and warnings is commonly proper-use information.70 As emphasised 
by Judge Calabresi in Liriano v. Hobart Corp.,71 a warning does more than provide 
information about a product’s dangerousness – product attribute information; it also 
provides information about how the product should be used – product use information.
 Proper-use information is also publicised by government agencies. The CPSC’s 
public information disclosures include safety suggestions, i.e. suggestions on how to 
use products safely.72 For example, the CPSC’s website includes an Extension Cords 
Fact Sheet with suggestions on how to avoid risks associated with extension cords.73 
Similarly, the FTC publicises information on the proper use of different products and 
services, including credit cards and automobiles.74 The SEC provides information on 
the proper use of investment products. For example, it emphasises the importance of 
diversifi cation.75 And the FDA publicises information on the proper use of food and 
drug products.76 
 In Europe, as well, many products must be marked with, or accompanied by, clear 
and adequate instructions. For instance, where skates, roller skates, online skates, 
68 See above note 53.
69 Tort law often exempts manufacturers from liability whenever the harm could be avoided had the 
consumer followed the warning. See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, cmt. j (1965) (‘Where 
[adequate] warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a 
product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor 
is it unreasonably dangerous.’); Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 495 A.2d 348, 356 (Md. 1985), note 
12 (‘If a product otherwise unreasonably dangerous can be made safe for reasonably foreseeable uses by 
adequate warnings or instructions, liability will be avoided, and the focus in such cases is generally on 
the adequacy of the notice. If the warnings or instructions are adequate the product is not defective, and 
the plaintiff cannot recover under a theory of strict liability in tort. The cause of the injury in such cases is 
the failure to read or follow the adequate warnings or instructions, and not a defective product.’). See also 
Latin, above note 11, at 1258 (describing and criticising Section 402A, Comment J, and other tort doctrines, 
like proximate cause and the unforeseeable misuse defence, that have been used to exempt manufacturers 
from liability based on warnings). The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability takes a less extreme 
approach but still counts the existence of a warning as a relevant consideration in establishing liability. 
See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 2, cmt. f (1998) (listing instructions and warranties 
accompanying the product as a relevant factor ‘in determining whether an alternative design is reasonable 
and whether its omission renders a product not reasonably safe’).
70 See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Product Liability § 2, cmt. i (1998) (‘Commercial product sellers 
must provide reasonable instructions and warnings about risks of injury posed by products. Instructions 
inform persons how to use and consume products safely.’). In fact, tort law often allows manufacturers 
to get away with an unsafe product design as long as they provide proper-use warnings. For example, the 
manufacturer of a toy BB-gun with lethal power was able to avoid liability by including a warning that the 
gun should not be pointed at any person. And the manufacturer of a lawnmower with inadequate protective 
skirts was able to avoid liability by including a warning that the lawnmower should not be operated when 
any person (other than the operator) is in its vicinity. See Latin, above note 11, at 1195-1196 (citing Sherk 
v. Daisy-Heddon, 450 A.2d 615 (Pa. 1982) (BB-gun case) and Dugan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 454 N.E.2d 
64 (1983) (lawnmower case)).
71 Liriano v. Hobart Corp., 170 F.3d 264, 270-271 (1999). See also J.A. Henderson, Jr. and A.D. Twerski, 
‘Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn’ (1990) 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 
265, 285.
72 15 U.S.C. §§ 2054-2055 (the CPSC can collect and disclose information on product risks).
73 See CPSC Extension Cords Fact Sheet, CPSC Document No. 16, available at: <http://www.cpsc.gov/
cpscpub/pubs/16.html> (last visited 13 March 2010) (on extension cords).
74 See: <http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/consumer.shtm> (last visited 13 March 2010).
75 SEC Beginners’ Guide to Asset Allocation, Diversifi cation, and Rebalancing, available at: <http://
www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/assetallocation.htm> (last visited 13 March 2010).
76 See FDA Consumer Advice and Publications on Food Safety, Nutrition, and Cosmetics, available at: 
<http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/advice.html> (last visited 9 August 2007). For information on the proper 
use of drugs/medicine, see FDA Consumer Education/Information, available at: <http://www.fda.gov/cder/
drug/DrugSafety/drugSafetyConsumer.htm> (last visited 9 August 2007); FDA Consumer Information: 
Safe Use of Over-the-Counter Drug Products, available at: <http://www.fda.gov/cder/offi ces/otc/consumer.
htm> (last visited 9 August 2007).
106 OREN BAR-GILL AND FRANCO FERRARI 
skateboards, scooters and toy bicycles for children are offered for sale as toys, they must 
bear the warning ‘Protective equipment should be worn. Not to be used in traffi c.’77 
More generally, EU law expressly requires that toys be accompanied by ‘instructions … 
which … shall draw the attention of users or their supervisors to the inherent hazards 
and risks of harm involved in using the toys, and to the ways of avoiding such hazards 
and risks.’78 Medicinal products, too, must be accompanied by 
the necessary and usual instructions for proper use, in particular: the dosage, the method and, if necessary, 
route of administration, the frequency of administration, specifying if necessary, the appropriate time at 
which the medicinal product may or must be administered, and, as appropriate, depending on the nature 
of the product: the duration of treatment, where it should be limited, the action to be taken in the case of 
an overdose (e.g., symptoms, emergency procedures), the course of action to take when one or more doses 
have not been taken, indication, if necessary, of the risk of withdrawal effects.79
Disclosure of proper-use information is clearly important. But proper-use information 
also suffers from an important limitation. Although it is appropriate for use dimensions 
that have a single, well-defi ned proper use, not all use dimensions have a single, well-
defi ned proper use. There is one proper way to wash a pair of jeans. There is no single, 
well-defi ned way to use a credit card.80 When proper use is not well defi ned, and even 
when it is well defi ned, sellers can disclose another type of product use information – 
actual-use information. We next consider statistical actual-use information, i.e. average-
use or typical-use information.
3.2 Product-Attribute Information with Average-Use Benchmarking
Use-pattern information is sometimes provided indirectly through product attribute 
disclosures. We have argued that product use depends on product attributes.81 But 
product attributes can also depend on product use. For example, the fuel effi ciency of 
an automobile depends on technical features of the vehicle and on how the vehicle is 
driven, e.g. city driving versus highway driving. A pure product attribute disclosure 
would include only technical information on the car’s engine, weight and so forth. 
Most consumers will fi nd it diffi cult to effectively use such a disclosure when choosing 
among different cars. Alternatively, the law may prefer a more comprehensible ‘impure’ 
product attribute disclosure that presumes a certain use pattern. For example, automobile 
manufacturers can be required to disclose miles-per-gallon information that necessarily 
presumes specifi c driving behaviour. Indeed, mandated disclosures sometimes assume, 
explicitly or implicitly, a certain use pattern and provide information on price, quality 
or risk based on this use pattern.82
 Elaborating on the fuel effi ciency example, expenditures on gasoline are a major 
cost of car ownership. As noted above, these expenditures are a function of a vehicle’s 
inherent fuel effi ciency and its owner’s use patterns. The EPA decided that the best way 
to communicate gasoline cost information is through miles-per-gallon disclosures. Of 
course, the same vehicle will drive 10 miles-per-gallon under certain conditions and 
20 miles-per-gallon under different conditions. The EPA chose two use patterns, ‘city 
driving’ and ‘highway driving’, and provided miles-per-gallon ratings for these two 
uses. Obviously, most consumers drive both in the city and on the highway and they 
divide their driving between these two uses in different proportions. Moreover, there is 
more than one way to drive in a city and more than one way to drive on the highway. 
But some benchmark had to be chosen.83
77 See EP and Council Directive 2009/48/EC, OJ 2009 L 170/1.
78 See Art. 10(2) of EP and Council Directive 2009/48/EC, OJ 2009 L 170/1.
79 Art. 59(1)(d) of EP and Council Directive 2001/83/EC, OJ 2001 L 311/67.
80 General statements like ‘Do not borrow too much’ or ‘Use your card prudently’ will not be very helpful.
81 See above Part 2.
82 To take a banal example, disclosure requirements under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act include 
the warning: ‘Harmful if Swallowed’. See 15 U.S.C. § 1261; 16 C.F.R. § 1500; Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, Offi ce of Compliance, Labeling and Banning Requirements for Chemicals and Other 
Hazardous Substances (2002) at 3, available at: <http://www.cpsc.gov/businfo/regsumfhsa.pdf> (US law); 
EP and Council Regulation (EC) No. 1272/2008, OJ 2008 L 353/1 (EU law).
83 Energy Policy and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6201. See also Craswell, above note 39, at 581-582 
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 Similarly, in the European Union, fuel consumption is generally expressed in either 
litres per 100 kilometres (l/100 km) or kilometres per litre (km/l).84 Moreover, EU law 
expressly recognises the importance of different use patterns. Directive 1999/94/EC 
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999 relating to the 
availability of consumer information on fuel economy and CO2 emissions in respect 
of the marketing of new passenger cars requires that fuel economy labels for new 
passenger cars state: ‘driving behaviour as well as other non-technical factors play a 
role in determining a car’s fuel consumption’.85
 The energy effi ciency feature of home appliances is similarly disclosed using a 
typical-use benchmark. A major cost of home appliances is energy cost. The energy 
cost depends on product attributes, i.e. on the technical features of the appliance, and 
on the consumer’s use patterns. The FTC has constructed an energy effi ciency index for 
appliances based on typical use and requires manufacturers to disclose their product’s 
‘Energy Effi ciency Rating’.86
 Nutrition information listed on food labels provides another example. The Nutrition 
Labeling and Education Act requires disclosure, on food product labels, of the quantities 
of twelve important nutrients.87 The quantity of a nutrient is pure product attribute 
information. But the health benefi ts or risks of a product do not depend only on this 
quantity measure. Use-pattern information, specifi cally how much one consumes of 
this and other food products, is as important as the quantity of nutrients per 100 grams. 
And food labels do include some indirect information on product use. Specifi cally, 
labels provide information on the quantity of nutrients per serving. The assumption is 
that the average consumer consumes one serving (or, alternatively, that the per-serving 
information will be used by the consumer to calculate total value). Food labels also 
provide ‘percent daily value’ information for the included nutrients. Percent daily value 
information depends not only on how much one consumes of the particular product 
but also on the consumer’s overall diet. Food product manufacturers must include 
the statement ‘Percent Daily Values are based on a 2,000 calorie diet’. And, in some 
cases, a more detailed disclosure of daily values based on both a 2,000-calorie and a 
2,500-calorie diet is required.88
 Required disclosure of the risks associated with cigarette smoking also makes certain 
assumptions about use patterns. We focus on the US Surgeon General’s warnings that 
appear on cigarette labels and advertisements,89 although similar warnings are required 
in Europe.90 One warning reads: ‘Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease, and 
May Complicate Pregnancy.’ Another reads: ‘Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces 
Serious Risks to Your Health.’ And a third reads: ‘Smoking by Pregnant Women May 
Result in Fetal Injury, Premature Birth, and Low Birth Weight.’ The risks of smoking 
(‘the EPA publishes only two indices of automobile gasoline consumption (“city” and “highway” miles-
per-gallon ratings), each of which is a rough attempt to refl ect the driving habits of millions of different 
drivers.’).
84 See EP and Council Directive 1999/94/EC, OJ 2000 L 12 16.
85 Id., at Annex I(6).
86 16 C.F.R. § 305 (Rule Concerning Disclosures Regarding Energy Consumption and Water Use of 
Certain Home Appliances and Other Products Required under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
– ‘Appliance Labeling Rule’). See also Craswell, above note 39, at 581-582 (‘the energy used by a home 
appliance will vary depending on consumers’ usage patterns, and the actual cost of that energy will also 
vary depending on local electricity rates. It might have been possible to present this data in a complicated 
table, so that consumers could use their own electric bills (and their knowledge of their own usage patterns) 
to estimate their energy costs with some precision. However, the FTC believed that few consumers had 
the time or the patience to calculate their actual costs in this way, so it constructed its own index of likely 
energy costs which allowed the costs of different appliances (relative to other appliances of the same type) 
to be disclosed in the form of a single “Energy Effi ciency Rating”’.).
87 21 U.S.C. § 301.
88 21 C.F.R. § 101.9(d)(9).
89 The Comprehensive Smoking Education Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341.
90 See Directive 2001/37/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 June 2001 on the 
approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning the 
manufacture, presentation and sale of tobacco products.
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depend on the number of cigarettes smoked. The risk from smoking one cigarette a 
month is not equal to the risk of smoking two packs a day. The Surgeon General’s 
warnings implicitly assume that most smokers smoke more than one cigarette a month.
 These Surgeon General’s warnings are required by law. But tobacco companies 
voluntarily provide additional information about the risks of smoking. Specifi cally they 
provide information about the levels of tar and nicotine produced by the cigarette. This 
information, while voluntarily disclosed, is certifi ed by the FTC. Tar and nicotine levels 
depend on product attributes as well as on use patterns. The FTC developed a machine-
based test to objectively measure tar and nicotine levels, and the tar and nicotine 
measures provided by the FTC test assume a certain intensity of smoking – a 2-second, 
35-milliliter puff every minute. 91 It is now understood that the FTC’s machine-based 
test does not refl ect any reasonable assumption about typical smoking behaviour.92 First, 
the machine-based FTC test has been shown to only poorly represent actual smoking 
by humans. 93 Second, if a cigarette provides less nicotine and less tar per puff, smokers 
will compensate by taking deeper, longer or more frequent puffs from their cigarettes,94 
or simply by smoking more cigarettes, i.e. by changing their use patterns.95 The FTC 
rating ignores the critical impact of such compensation.
 Cigarette manufacturers use the FTC’s nicotine and tar ratings to promote ‘low tar’ 
and ‘light’ cigarettes.96 Moreover, a 1981 Surgeon General’s report encouraged smokers 
who are unable to quit to switch to cigarettes that scored better on the FTC rating.97 
These inducements worked. Some 85% of all smokers today use the supposedly 
safer cigarettes.98 But it is now clear that these cigarettes are not safer, because of the 
compensation effect.99 The FTC recognised the importance of use patterns and how 
the compensation effect limits the informative value of its nicotine and tar ratings. A 
consumer alert published by the FTC emphasises the importance of use patterns:
The Federal Trade Commission wants you to know that cigarette tar and nicotine ratings can’t predict the 
amount of tar and nicotine you get from any particular cigarette. That’s because how you smoke a cigarette 
can signifi cantly affect the amount of tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide you get from your cigarette.100
The FTC even proposed required disclosures that emphasise use patterns. The two 
alternative disclosures proposed by the FTC were:
91 FTC News Release, ‘FTC Proposes New Method for Testing Amounts of Tar, Nicotine, and Carbon 
Monoxide in Cigarettes: New System Will Provide Consumers With Improved Info. About Cigarette Tar 
and Nicotine Yields’, 9 September 1997 [hereinafter FTC News Release]. The FTC proposed to make 
disclosed tar and nicotine levels more informative by adding a second, high-intensity rating, based on a 
2-second, 55-milliliter puff every 30 seconds. Id. The FTC ratings are voluntarily disclosed by the major 
cigarette companies in all cigarette advertisements. Id. In particular, these ratings are used to promote ‘low 
tar’ and ‘light’ cigarettes. See e.g. Advertisement for Merit, Merit Low Tar Kings Soft, Merit Ultima Kings 
Soft and Merit Ultra Lights Kings Soft, ‘Now you’re on the road. You’ve got Merit’, Philip Morris USA 
Advertising Archive, Document ID 2061038984, available at: <http://www.pmadarchive.com> (last visited 
13 March 2010 [hereinafter Merit Advertisement].
92 See also J. Foulds et al., ‘Health Effects of Tobacco, Nicotine, and Exposure to Tobacco Smoke 
Pollution’ in J. Brick (ed.), Handbook of the Medical Consequences of Alcohol and Drug Abuse (2008) 423 
at 435 et seq.
93 See FTC Consumer Alert, ‘Up in Smoke: The Truth About Tar and Nicotine Ratings’ (May 2000) 
[hereinafter FTC Consumer Alert] (‘people don’t smoke cigarettes the same way the machine does’); 
Editorial, ‘The Safer Cigarette Delusion’, N.Y. Times, 28 August 2006, at A14 [hereinafter The Safer 
Cigarette Delusion].
94 See Foulds et al., above note 92, at 437.
95 See FTC Consumer Alert, above note 93; FTC News Release, above note 91; U.S. v. Philip Morris 
USA, Inc., 449 F.Supp.2d 1, 337-338 (D.D.C., 2006); The Safer Cigarette Delusion, at A14 (‘More than 95 
percent of all smokers compensate, with many replacing every bit of tar and nicotine they thought they were 
avoiding.’).
96 See e.g. Merit Advertisement, above note 91.
97 The Safer Cigarette Delusion, at A14.
98 Id.
99 See also Foulds et al., above note 92, at 438.
100 See FTC Consumer Alert, above note 93.
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1) There’s no such thing as a safe smoke. Even cigarettes with low ratings can 
give you high amounts of tar and nicotine. It depends on how you smoke; 
or
2) How much tar and nicotine you get from a cigarette depends on how 
intensely you smoke it.101
These proposals were not implemented.102 The tar and nicotine disclosures described 
above demonstrate the importance of choosing accurate typical-use assumptions. 
Inadequate provision of use-pattern information renders the product attribute information 
meaningless, even misleading. Of course, product attribute disclosure based on accurate 
typical-use benchmarking can be helpful.
3.3 Direct Disclosure of Average-Use Information
The previous section provides examples of average-use information indirectly disclosed 
as a benchmark for product attribute disclosures. While average-use information is 
helpful even when it is disclosed indirectly, in some markets lawmakers should consider 
mandating direct disclosure of average-use information. For example, there is evidence 
suggesting that consumers are too quick to purchase extended warranties and other 
insurance riders that are commonly offered as add-ons with basic consumer products. 
The small likelihood of an event that would trigger the warranty or insurance coverage, 
coupled with the relatively small cost that the consumer would bear if such an event 
occurs, cannot justify the price of the add-on. One possible remedy for this category 
of mistakes – overestimation of the value of the insurance product – is to provide use-
pattern information. As suggested by Professors Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff, sellers 
could be required to provide information on the probability that an extended warranty 
would be invoked. 103 Or, even better, sellers could be required to provide an estimate of 
the total repair or replacement costs that a typical consumer would save by purchasing 
the extended warranty. With this use-pattern information, extended warranties and 
similar insurance add-ons would likely suffer a sharp decline in sales.104
 In the rebates context, Jeff Sovern has recently proposed that sellers offering rebates 
be required to disclose the low redemption rates.105 Similarly, if Blockbuster’s customers 
underestimate the likelihood, and hence the cost, of tardiness in returning their video 
rentals, then Blockbuster could be required to disclose the number of late returns and the 
total fee payments that an average consumer pays over a one-year period. If Hewlett-
Packard (HP) customers, when purchasing a home printer, underestimate the number 
of ink cartridges that they will purchase over the life of the printer, then HP can be 
required to provide the missing use-pattern information, perhaps based on an FTC-
designed average-use index. Even better, HP could be required to disclose average Total 
Cost of Ownership (TCO) information that combines the use-pattern information with 
ink prices. Similar average-use or total price information could be provided by sellers 
of base goods and add-ons bundles. With such information, for example, a consumer 
choosing between two hotels could compare not only room rates but also total price 
fi gures, based on an average add-on use index (e.g. two phone- calls, one in-room meal, 
one movie, etc.). And health clubs could be required to disclose the effective per-visit 
101 FTC News Release, above note 91.
102 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (specifying the required disclosures); 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334 (preemption – ‘No 
statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by section 1333 of this title, 
shall be required on any cigarette package.’).
103 See B. Nalebuff and I. Ayres, Why Not? (2003) at 181 (‘Circuit City or Ford could tell you the odds of 
actually making a claim against an extended warranty.’). See also I. Ayres, Super Crunchers (2007).
104 Interestingly, use-pattern information for the insurance add-on is a function of both product attribute 
information and product use information for the base good. For example, the likelihood that an extended 
warranty will be invoked depends on the reliability of the base good and on how the base good is used.
105 See Sovern, above note 42, at 1703. See also J.G. Lynch and G. Zauberman, ‘When Do You Want It? 
Time, Decisions, and Public Policy’ (2006) 25 J. Public Policy and Marketing 67 at 71 (making a similar 
proposal).
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fee paid by an average subscription holder. If this effective per-visit fee is eight times 
higher than the club’s actual per-visit fee, some consumers may reconsider their decision 
to purchase a subscription.106
 Direct average-use disclosures could also be effective in the credit card market. 
Some consumers are sometimes late in paying their credit card bill. And when they are 
late, they are assessed a ‘late fee’. This late fee is prominently disclosed in credit card 
solicitations, in accordance with the disclosure regulations issued under the Truth in 
Lending Act (TILA).107 But this product attribute disclosure will not be very effective 
if consumers underestimate the likelihood of paying late. TILA disclosures, especially 
disclosures in card solicitations, are supposed to help consumers make an informed 
choice among the many competing credit card products. Such informed choice is crucial 
for the effi cient operation of the credit card market. A consumer who underestimates the 
likelihood of paying late and triggering a late fee will not make a truly informed choice, 
even if he or she has perfect information about the magnitude of the late fee. The TILA 
disclosure apparatus can and should be amended to include use-pattern disclosures. 
Specifi cally, issuers can be required to disclose the number of late payments that an 
average consumer makes in a year or the amount that an average consumer pays in late 
fees in one year.
 Moving from late payments to debt repayment rates, a recent amendment to the 
Truth in Lending Act requires issuers to provide average-use information. Congress was 
concerned that consumers lack information on the cost of slow repayment. Specifi cally, 
many consumers who make only the minimum monthly payment underestimate the 
amount of time that it will take them to repay their credit card debt and, consequently, 
underestimate the total amount of interest that they will end up paying. In response, 
Congress required issuers to disclose on the monthly statement the length of time it will 
take an average consumer to repay a typical balance in full if he or she makes only the 
minimum required payment each month.108
 Credit card issuers engage in intertemporal bundling in response to underestimation 
of future use by offering low teaser interest rates for an introductory period. Issuers 
could be required to disclose information on average switching rates or information on 
the average interest rate that the consumer will pay, accounting for borrowing patterns 
in both the introductory and post-introductory periods. The evidence suggests that such 
disclosures would reduce the attractiveness of teaser rate offers. Overestimation of 
switching affects not only the perceived value of teaser rate offers but also the perceived 
cost of other mid-stream changes that issuers make. Disclosure of switching rates can 
help reduce these cost misperceptions as well.
 Direct average-use disclosure can also be helpful in other consumer credit markets. 
Mortgage lenders that offer loans with increasing interest rates could be required to 
disclose the average balance-weighted interest rate, or the average monthly payment, 
over the life of the loan. Lenders could also be required to disclose the average likelihood 
of incurring each of the many penalty fees included in the loan contract and, perhaps, 
the total fees paid by an average consumer. And in response to consumer optimism 
106 See S. DellaVigna and U. Malmendier, ‘Paying Not to Go to the Gym’ (2006) 96 Am. Econ. Rev. 694. 
Many consumers might think that they will attend the health club more often than the average consumer. 
Thus health clubs could also be required to provide information on the effective per-visit price paid by 
an above-average consumer, e.g. a consumer at the eightieth percentile of the distribution. The disclosure 
could read: ‘For 80% of subscription holders the effective per-visit fee is more than X.’
107 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.18, 226.5a.
108 The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Public Law 109-8, 119 Stat 
23 [hereinafter BAPCPA] § 1301 (the required disclosure is: ‘Minimum Payment Warning: Making only the 
minimum payment will increase the interest you pay and the time it takes to repay your balance. For example, 
making only the typical 2% minimum monthly payment on a balance of $1,000 at an interest rate of 17% 
would take 88 months to repay the balance in full.’). See also T.A. Durkin, ‘Requirements and Prospects 
for a New Time to Payoff Disclosure for Open End Credit Under Truth in Lending’ (2006) FEDS Working 
Paper No. 2006-34, available at: <http://www.federalreserve.gov/Pubs/feds/2006/200634/200634pap.pdf> 
(describing the new disclosure requirement). The typical balance stated in Section 1301 is $1,000. To what 
extent this balance is in fact typical is questionable. Moreover, there is a risk that a consumer with a balance 
of $5,000 will simply multiply the disclosed repayment period for a $1,000 balance by fi ve, leading to 
underestimation of the repayment period.
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about refi nancing options, lenders could disclose the average likelihood of refi nancing. 
Payday lenders could also be required to provide average-use information. Specifi cally, 
they could be required to disclose the average number of roll-overs and, based on the 
average number of roll-overs, the total fee paid by an average consumer. For example, 
the disclosure could read: ‘The fee is $30 for a two-week, $200 advance. The average 
borrower renews his or her loan three times (i.e. takes three consecutive advances) 
before repaying. Therefore, the total fee on a $200 loan is $90 for an average borrower.’
 Average-use disclosures can also prove helpful in the cell-phone market. A common 
feature of the wireless service contract is the lock-in clause, which ties the consumer to 
a specifi c provider for as long as two years. Consumers might underestimate the cost of 
lock-in.109 In fact, in the absence of signifi cant fi xed costs, this lock-in feature of wireless 
service contracts may well be a strategic response to consumers’ underestimation of the 
cost of lock-in. Average-use disclosure can reduce this underestimation bias. Sellers can 
be required to provide information about the percentage of consumers who stop using 
their phones, but continue paying for them, before the end of the lock-in period. Sellers 
can also be required to disclose the percentage of consumers who break the contract and 
pay the exit penalty.
 We have argued that proper-use information is appropriate for use dimensions 
that have a single, well-defi ned proper use. When there are many proper uses for a 
product, proper-use disclosure loses its bite. In such cases, the alternative is average-
use disclosure. But average-use disclosure suffers from a similar limitation. When 
heterogeneous consumers use the same product in many different ways, average-use 
information might be of little value. The value of average-use information depends 
on the degree of heterogeneity. The degree of heterogeneity is a function of both 
product characteristics and characteristics of the consumer group. But the degree of 
heterogeneity is also a function of the disclosure regime. The question is whether the 
seller discloses average-use information where the averaging is done across the entire 
group of consumers or whether the averaging on which the disclosure is based is done 
across a smaller, more homogenous subgroup of consumers.
 At one extreme, the seller considers the average consumer who enters its store or even 
the average consumer in the market. Average use, under these assumptions, contains 
little information. But often the seller has more information – based on demographics, 
product choice and so forth. Based on this information, the seller can place the consumer 
in a subgroup of consumers who share a set of observed characteristics. Now average 
use becomes average use within this subgroup. As the subgroup becomes smaller, the 
consumer heterogeneity problem decreases and the value of the average-use information 
increases. Disclosure of average-use information, when averaging is done over smaller 
subgroups, is advantageous and should be expanded.
3.4 Individual-Use Information
The consumer heterogeneity problem limits the effi cacy of average-use disclosure. It 
also supports individual-use disclosure.110 In certain markets, where sellers enter into 
long-term relationships with consumers, sellers can be required to provide the consumer 
with individualised information on his or her use patterns. An immediate objection 
to this prescription is that sellers have better information than consumers about the 
attributes of their product, and that they generally have better information about proper 
use and average use, but that they do not have better information than the consumer 
109 Consumers will underestimate the cost of lock-in if they underestimate the likelihood of contingencies 
that would induce them to end the contract earlier, e.g. the appearance of a more attractive offer from 
another provider, a change in their need for wireless services or an unanticipated fi nancial hardship that 
reduces the available income left for non-necessities like wireless phone services. Simple myopia might 
also lead to underestimation of the cost of lock-in.
110 See also Ayres, above note 103 (arguing for individualised disclosure).
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about the individual consumer’s use patterns. This is surely true about some products. 
It is not true about all products. The following examples demonstrate the feasibility of 
individual-use disclosures in several consumer markets.111
3.4.1 Credit Cards
The credit card market is an example of an economically signifi cant market where 
sellers can disclose individual-use information to consumers. Credit card issuers often 
have more information about how a consumer will use the credit card than the consumer 
him or herself. First, issuers have detailed statistics about card use, including statistics 
about card use in the consumer’s demographic and socio-economic group. Second, 
issuers have information on the individual consumer from the credit card application 
and from credit bureaus. Third, and most importantly, since issuers often maintain 
long-term relationships with consumers, they quickly obtain information about how the 
individual consumer uses his or her specifi c card. Most of this information is available 
to the consumer, but many consumers do not know or do not remember all the relevant 
information. Also, many consumers do not consolidate information from these different 
sources and do not use sophisticated algorithms to analyse the information and predict 
future use based on this information. Issuers, on the other hand, consolidate all relevant 
information, store it in databases, update it regularly and analyse it using sophisticated 
algorithms that can also predict future use.112
 Recall the late payment and late fee example. We argued that the disclosure of the 
late fee – a product attribute disclosure – might be less effective if many consumers 
underestimate the likelihood of paying late. In discussing average-use disclosures, 
we suggested mandating disclosure of the number of late payments that an average 
consumer makes over a one-year period. We also noted the limits of such a disclosure, 
as most consumers will optimistically believe that they will pay late less often than 
the average consumer. A better solution is to require disclosure of individualised late 
payment information.113 Issuers keep records on consumers’ late payments. They can be 
required to disclose the number of late payments made by the specifi c consumer or the 
total amount of late fees paid by the consumer over the past year.114
111 Scepticism about the feasibility of regulations requiring disclose of actual individualised information 
was recently expressed by Christine Jolls and Cass Sunstein. See C. Jolls and C.R. Sunstein, ‘Debiasing 
through Law’ (2006) 35 J. Legal Stud. 199, 209 (rejecting the possibility of requiring the disclosure of 
individualised information about product risk). Jolls and Sunstein write that ‘it is diffi cult to imagine 
incorporating such individualised information into a general legal standard’. The disclosure regulation 
proposed below is not in the form of a general legal standard. Rather, we advocate market-specifi c 
disclosure mandates. In addition to the feasibility concern, individualised disclosure raises a privacy 
concern. At this point, however, we propose disclosure only of information that sellers collect anyway. 
However, if disclosure requirements affect sellers’ information collection and retention practices, then the 
privacy concern will have to be addressed.
112 See M. Furletti, ‘Credit Card Pricing Developments and Their Disclosure 6-9’ (2003) Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, Payment Cards Center, Discussion Paper, available at: <http://www.philadelphiafed.
org/pcc/papers/2003/CreditCardPricing_012003.pdf> Duncan McDonald, former general counsel of 
Citigroup’s Europe and North America card businesses, notes: ‘No other industry in the world knows 
consumers and their transaction behavior better than the bank card industry. It has turned the analysis of 
consumers into a science rivaling the studies of DNA … . The mathematics of virtually everything consumers 
do is stored, updated, categorized, churned, scored, tested, valued, and compared from every possible angle 
in hundreds of the most powerful computers and by among the most creative minds anywhere. In the past 
10 years alone, the transactions of 200 million Americans have been reviewed in trillions of different ways 
to minimize bank card risks.’ See D.A. MacDonald, ‘Viewpoint: Card Industry Questions Congress Needs 
to Ask’ (2007) American Banker 10.
113 There may still be optimism at play, limiting the effectiveness of even individualised disclosure. A 
consumer might be forced to acknowledge that he or she, not some average consumer, has paid a lot of 
money in late fees over the past year, but may still believe that he or she will not repeat this behaviour in 
the future. Of course, such optimism will become less likely as the disclosed history reveals year after year 
of high penalty payments.
114 Issuers provide year-end summaries with individualised information. These summaries, however, 
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 We now move from late fees to over-limit fees. Disclosure of individualised use-
pattern information can also be effective when provided at the point of sale. Professor 
Ronald Mann proposed that issuers be required to disclose, through merchants, when 
a certain purchase would take the consumer over his or her credit limit, triggering 
an over-limit fee. Such a disclosure could help the consumer to avoid inadvertently 
exceeding his or her credit limit, perhaps by switching to another card or to another 
payment system.115 With respect to the debt-repayment dimension, we noted the recent 
addition of an average-use disclosure mandate requiring issuers to provide, on the 
monthly statement, information on the average length of time it will take to pay off a 
typical balance if the consumer makes only the minimum payment each month.116 The 
new disclosure has an individual-use component as well. Issuers must provide a phone 
number that the consumer can call to receive information on the length of time it will 
take that consumer to pay off his or her specifi c balance if the consumer makes only the 
minimum payment each month. While this option to receive individualised repayment 
rate information is a step in the right direction, it would probably be more effective if 
the individualised disclosure was provided automatically on each monthly statement.117
3.4.2 Cell Phones
The cellular phone market is an example of another economically signifi cant market 
where the long-term relationship between providers and consumers allows for the 
provision of individualised use-pattern information. Evidence of consumer mistakes 
in the cell phone market suggests that such individualised disclosure may be helpful. 
A notable design feature of mobile service contracts is the steep jump in per minute 
charges when the consumer exceeds the plan limit. Many contracts specify an increase 
of over 100% in the per-minute price, with some contracts specifying increases of 200% 
and beyond.118 Arguably, the high prices set for minutes beyond the plan limit target 
consumers’ underestimation of their future use of the cellular phone.119
 Individualised disclosure can reduce consumer mistakes about cell phone use. In 
particular, sellers can provide individualised use information, focusing the consumer’s 
attention on use exceeding the plan limit.120 This disclosure could be supplemented by 
information on alternative service plans that would reduce the total price paid by the 
consumer, given his or her current use patterns.121 Individual-use information can be 
especially helpful for consumers who inadvertently exceed the plan limit. The challenge 
of keeping track of cumulative use has increased with the invention of multiple-
focus more on spending behaviour and less on borrowing behaviour (see e.g. the ‘Year-End Summary’ 
feature offered by several credit card companies, which provides an annual itemised list of all charges). 
Accordingly, the total amount paid in interest charges or late fees is not disclosed.
115 See Mann, above note 3, at 162. A proposed bill, H.R. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001), in Section 10, goes 
beyond disclosure and prohibits the imposition of over-limit fees for creditor-approved transactions. 
116 BAPCPA, § 1301. See also Durkin, above note 108 (describing the new disclosure requirement).
117 Compare § 2 of the proposed bill, H.R. 1052, 107th Cong. (2001). See also Mann, above note 3, at 160-
161 (proposing an individualised disclosure on the monthly bill and arguing that such a disclosure is not too 
costly to implement).
118 See S. DellaVigna and U. Malmendier, ‘Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence’ 
(2004) 119 Quarterly Journal of Economics 353 at 380; Verizon Wireless, America’s Choice® Basic Plans, 
available at: <http://www.verizonwireless.com> (last visited 5 June 2007) (quoting mark-ups in excess 
of 300% for minutes beyond the plan limit). See also Nalebuff and Ayres, above note 103, at 178-179 
(describing the high post-plan minute prices as ‘hidden pricing’).
119 Clearly, these huge increases do not refl ect a corresponding change in the provider’s per-minute cost. 
See M.D. Grubb, ‘Selling to Overconfi dent Consumers’ (2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=721701>; O. Bar-Gill and R. Stone, ‘Mobile Misperceptions’ (2009) 23 Harvard 
Journal of Law & Technology.
120 Or to use that is substantially below the plan limit and would merit a switch to a lower limit/lower 
fee plan. Carriers, both in the United States and in Europe, already provide certain use information on the 
monthly bill.
121 Utility companies in Germany have voluntarily adopted an even more pro-consumer policy. At the end 
of the year, they retroactively match each consumer to the service plan under which the consumer pays the 
lowest total price given his or her use over the past year. See Nalebuff and Ayres, above note 103, at 27.
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limit plans, e.g. plans with different limits for peak and off-peak minutes. To reduce 
the incidence of inadvertently exceeding the plan limit, issuers could be required to 
notify consumers, via a recorded message or a text message, when they are about to 
exceed the plan limit. A consumer receiving such notifi cation may well decide to cut 
the conversation short, switch to a land line or postpone the conversation until off-peak 
hours.122
3.4.3 Other Markets
Sellers have individual-use information in many other markets. Some of this information 
is currently being disclosed to consumers, but enhanced disclosure requirements may 
be desirable. For example, phone (not cell phone) companies disclose certain use 
information to consumers on their monthly bills. More effective disclosure would 
include use patterns averaged across several months, perhaps accompanied by total cost 
information under the consumer’s current plan as well as under alternative plans offered 
by the phone company.123 Health clubs could also be required to disclose individualised 
use-pattern information. Specifi cally, health clubs could disclose attendance records for 
the past year and even for the preceding year (or years). They could also calculate and 
disclose the per-visit fee paid by the individual subscription-holder. Faced with such 
information when asked to renew the subscription, the consumer may well decide to 
forgo the subscription and pay on a per-visit basis. Similarly, a retailer asking a consumer 
to renew a membership card or a discount card could be required to disclose the total 
savings enjoyed by the individual consumer over the past year. This information would 
assist the consumer in making a more informed decision as to whether to pay the annual 
fee and renew the membership.
 Netfl ix effectively competes with traditional video rental stores through a unique 
business model. For a constant monthly fee, the consumer gets a specifi ed number 
of movies, say three movies. The consumer can keep these three movies for as long 
as he or she likes. Whenever a movie is sent back to Netfl ix, the company promptly 
replaces it with the next movie on the consumer’s priority list. Under this model, a 
consumer who sees two movies a month pays the same price as a consumer who sees 
twenty movies a month. The question is whether consumers correctly anticipate their 
in-home movie-viewing patterns. Netfl ix could easily prevent consumers from making 
use-pattern mistakes. It could disclose the average number of videos that an individual 
consumer receives in a month, as well as the average price that the consumer pays per 
movie. With this information, the consumer would be able to compare prices across the 
different business models and make a more educated choice between Netfl ix and, say, 
Blockbuster.124
 Finally, simple disclosure could assist consumers who forget to cancel a service at the 
end of the introductory period. Service providers know precisely when the introductory 
period ends for each individual consumer. The service provider could be required to 
send a notice to each consumer two weeks before the introductory period ends for the 
individual consumer. This notice would remind the consumer that the low introductory 
122 Compare ‘usage alert’ mandates in Art. 6(a)(2) of Regulation (EC) No. 544/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009, amending Regulation (EC) No. 717/2007 on roaming 
on public mobile telephone networks within the Community and Directive 2002/21/EC on a common 
regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services. In the United States, the FCC 
is considering similar regulations. See Federal Communication Commission, Public Notice: Comment 
Sought on Measures Designed to Assist U.S. Wireless Consumers to Avoid ‘Bill Shock’, CG Docket No. 
09-158, 11 May 2010.
123 Utility companies also provide some individualised use-pattern information on the monthly statement. 
For instance ConEdison provides information on the individual consumer’s average daily use of electricity 
for previous months.
124 To further facilitate a comparison between Netfl ix and video rental stores that follow a traditional 
business model with late fees, Netfl ix’s competitors could be required to disclose the number of late 
payments made by the specifi c consumer or the total amount of late fees paid by the consumer over the past 
year. Of course, such individual-use disclosure is only feasible for consumers who maintain a long-term 
relationship with the video rental store (e.g. consumers who hold a membership card).
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price will soon be replaced by a higher post-introductory price and describe a low-
cost way to discontinue the service. This disclosure would prevent many inadvertent 
continuances of service beyond the introductory period.125
3.5 Designing Optimal Use-Pattern Disclosure
One of the main goals of this article is to establish use-pattern disclosure as a complement 
to product attribute disclosure in addressing behavioural market failures. Product-use 
information is clearly important for consumer decision-making and for the effi cient 
operation of consumer markets. But this is not enough. Successful disclosure regulation 
must effectively convey use-pattern information to consumers. The question is how to 
optimally design disclosure regulation. We do not purport to provide a comprehensive 
answer in this article.126 Still, the preceding discussion offers some general guidelines. 
First, when possible, use-pattern disclosure should be based on individual-use 
information. And when use-pattern disclosure is based on average-use information, the 
averages should be taken over a cost-effectively small subgroup of consumers.
 Second, in many cases, disclosure mandates should combine product attribute and 
product use information. For example, a consumer will benefi t from a disclosure stating 
the number of late payments he made on a credit card over the past year. He or she will 
likely benefi t even more from a disclosure that by combining price information and 
use information states the total amount that the consumer paid in late fees over the last 
year. And the most informative disclosure would combine price and use information in 
multiple dimensions. Such disclosure would state the total amount that the consumer 
paid in penalty fees and interest, including late fees, over-limit fees, penalty interest 
payments and so forth. The goal is to come as close as possible to Total Cost of 
Ownership (TCO) information. Due to the existence of multiple price dimensions 
and the fact that the relative importance of different price dimensions depends on use 
patterns, calculating total price can be diffi cult. Sellers should be required to make these 
calculations for consumers. Disclosure regulation should strive to provide consumers 
with meaningful price information in a simple, accessible way.127
3.6 The Costs and Limits of Disclosure
This article focuses on disclosure regulation because, compared to other forms of 
regulation, it is more compatible with free markets and, in most cases, more politically 
125 There is evidence that such inadvertent continuances are common. A recent bill introduced in the 
Israeli parliament (the Knesset) proposes a regulatory response similar to the one described in the text. 
Opposition to this bill by service providers suggests that inadvertent continuances are common and 
constitute a substantial revenue source for these service providers. See R. Linder-Ganz and Z. Zarhiya, 
‘Bill Prohibiting Automatic Contract Renewal Stuck in Committee’, Haaretz (2007). In the United States, 
state legislators have also been concerned about the problem of automatic contract renewal following a 
low-price introductory period. See e.g. Illinois Automatic Contract Renewal Act, 815 I.L.C.S. 601/1 et seq. 
(sellers must provide consumers with written notice of the automatic renewal no less than 30 days or more 
than 60 days prior to the date of the cancellation deadline for the renewal). Other state laws require only 
that sellers provide a general notice about cancellation rights, not an individualised notice prior to the end 
of the introductory period for the specifi c consumer. See e.g. Act Concerning Enforceability of Automatic 
Contract Renewal Provisions, H.R. 7204, Gen. Assem., Jan Sess. (Conn. 2007). See also HB 1702, 80th 
Leg. (Tex. 2007); S. 527, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2007).
126 On the optimal design of disclosure regulation, see e.g. Jolls and Sunstein, above note 111; Beales, 
Craswell and Salop, above note 18, at 529-531; Craswell, above note 39; L. Froeb et al., ‘Economic 
Research at the FTC: Information, Retrospectives, and Retailing’ (forthcoming) Review of Industrial 
Organisation, available at: <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=592101> (last visited 13 
March 2010); J.M. Lacko and J.K. Pappalardo, ‘The Effect of Mortgage Broker Compensation Disclosures 
on Consumers and Competition: A Controlled Experiment’ (2004), available at: <http://www.ftc.gov/os/2
004/01/030123mortgagesummary.pdf> (the FTC is studying the effi cacy of different disclosure techniques 
in the home mortgage market).
127 See Craswell, above note 39, at 692-694 (discussing single-price disclosures and detailing the costs of 
such disclosures).
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feasible. This does not mean that disclosure is always effective. Nor does it mean that 
disclosure, when effective, is without cost. We now consider the main costs of disclosure 
mandates and the main limits on the effi cacy of disclosure regulation. We begin with the 
general costs and limits of disclosure regulation. We then describe additional costs and 
limits specifi c to average-use disclosure. The shortcomings of average-use disclosure 
indirectly support an expansion of individual-use disclosure.128
3.6.1 The Costs of Disclosure
We begin with the direct costs of disclosure. These include the cost to sellers of collecting, 
compiling and distributing the information. They also include the cost to consumers 
who need to read the disclosure and process the disclosed information. In many of the 
examples provided in this article, the direct cost to sellers only amounts to the relatively 
minor cost of distributing the information. The reason for this is that sellers collect 
and compile the relevant information anyway. Credit card issuers, for example, have a 
powerful business motivation to obtain information on consumers’ use patterns.
 This relates to another, indirect cost of disclosure regulation. If sellers are required to 
disclose the information they collect, then they will have a weaker incentive to collect 
information.129 While this adverse incentive effect is undeniably true, its magnitude 
can be expected to be small in many markets, as the business reasons for collecting 
information will often outweigh the disclosure disincentive.130 Moreover, disclosure 
mandates commonly imply an obligation to collect the information to be disclosed. 
Of course, when the information would not have been collected absent the mandate, 
the cost of collection constitutes a cost of the disclosure regulation – a cost that will be 
passed on, at least in part, to consumers. And, in some markets, this cost might be so 
large that it would drive sellers out of the market.
3.6.2 The Limited Effi cacy of Disclosure
One of the main limits on the effi cacy of disclosure regulation concerns information 
overload. There is a limit on the amount of information that the average consumer can 
effectively process. Accordingly, disclosed information might be ignored or might 
replace other information, perhaps more important information, in the consumer’s 
decision-making process. The information overload problem cautions against increasing 
the amount of information disclosed.131 Even if consumers can process the disclosed 
information, it is not clear that they will do so. Provision of information, specifi cally use-
pattern information, can be helpful if consumers follow a deliberative decision-making 
process (even if this decision-making process is not fully rational). However, there is 
128 The costs and limits described below reduce the appeal of disclosure regulation even when designed 
and administered by regulators seeking to advance the public good. Unfortunately, not all regulators share 
this goal, and regulatory decision-making is too often guided by politics, not by the public good. Of course, 
these concerns apply to all forms of regulation and not specifi cally to disclosure regulation or to use-pattern 
disclosure.
129 Compare A.T. Kronman, ‘Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts’ (1978) 7 J. 
Legal Stud. 1 (arguing that contract law disclosure obligations might deter the acquisition of information).
130 Kronman distinguishes between deliberately acquired information and casually acquired information 
and argues that casually acquired information can be subject to disclosure mandates. Id. In Kronman’s 
terms, much of the information that sellers should disclose is casually acquired, i.e. it would have been 
acquired by sellers anyway for business reasons.
131 See e.g. Craswell, above note 39 (arguing that provision of additional information dilutes the 
effectiveness of existing disclosures); Korobkin, above note 11 (consumers can process only limited 
amounts of information); Government Accountability Offi ce, ‘Credit Cards: Increased Complexity in Rates 
and Fees Heightens Need for More Effective Disclosures to Consumers’ (2006) at 46, available at: <http://
www.gao.gov/new.items/d06929.pdf> (fi nding that credit card disclosures contain too much information); 
Furletti, above note 112, at 19 (concluding that it is not clear that requiring more details in regulatory 
disclosures would be useful for consumers.); Latin, above note 11.
 INFORMING CONSUMERS ABOUT THEMSELVES 117
evidence that, in some cases, consumer decision-making is driven by an emotional 
response rather than by a deliberative process or that emotions infl uence the deliberative 
process.132 In these cases, disclosure regulation will be less effective.
 Finally, even if consumers can process use-pattern information and would like to 
do so, the required information might not exist. This problem is especially acute with 
respect to new products. It takes time to collect information about average use. And 
the absence of historic information precludes individual-use disclosure. Moreover, 
these practical impediments to effective disclosure regulation can be manipulated by 
sellers. For example, in order to evade disclosure mandates, sellers might try to present 
a slightly modifi ed version of a product as a new product.
3.6.3 The Limited Effi cacy of Average-Use Disclosure
Average-use disclosure is subject to additional limitations. These limitations reinforce 
the case for individual-use disclosure. The fi rst, inherent limitation is an immediate 
implication of consumer heterogeneity. Averaging, by its very nature, implies loss of 
information. As the degree of heterogeneity among the relevant group of consumers 
increases, the value of average information decreases. For this reason, if sellers segment 
the market into small subgroups of consumers and can be required to disclose average-
use information within these more homogeneous subgroups, the value of the disclosure 
increases.133
 Optimism imposes another limit on the effi cacy of average-use disclosure. Most 
consumers will optimistically think that they are above average – that they will be late 
less often than the average consumer in paying their credit card bill, that they will repay 
their bill more quickly than the average consumer, that they are less likely than the 
average consumer to break their lock-in cell-phone contract and so forth. Still, average-
use information can be helpful. Consumers suffer from two types of misperception: 
(1) misperception about the mean; and (2) misperception about their position relative to 
the mean.134 Average-use information can be helpful in curing the former misperception.
 Moreover, optimally designed average-use information can minimise the optimism 
problem. First, measuring and disclosing average-use across smaller, more homogeneous 
groups of consumers should reduce the ‘we are all above average’ problem. Second, 
more sophisticated use of statistical information can reduce the optimism problem. 
Statistical use information need not be limited to straight averages. To take a specifi c 
example, the fact that an average consumer pays $200 in penalty fees over the course of 
the year might be dismissed by most consumers as irrelevant to them. These consumers 
will fi nd it more diffi cult to dismiss the fact that 80% of consumers pay more than $100 
a year in penalty fees. Disclosure of statistical use information describing the behaviour 
of a supermajority of consumers should reduce the optimism problem.135
 Finally, average-use disclosure might suffer from an endogeneity problem. Consider 
the rebates example. Assume that, absent disclosure, only 5% of consumers redeem 
the rebate. If the seller discloses this 5% fi gure, then most consumers will respond by 
ignoring the rebate and focusing on the pre-rebate price. These consumers will purchase 
a product with no rebate and a lower spot price. Still, a minority of highly motivated 
rebate users will prefer rebate pricing. And, in time, the rate of redemption, among 
this minority of rebate users, will rise to, say, 90%. If the seller updates the disclosure 
from a 5% redemption rate to a 90% redemption rate, there is a risk that the majority 
132 See e.g. J. O’Shaughnessy and N.J. O’Shaughnessy, The Marketing Power of Emotion (2002).
133 See Craswell, above note 39, at 691-692 (discussing heterogeneity as a limit of disclosures based on 
averages; Craswell does not focus on average use).
134 See Latin, above note 11, at 1243-1244.
135 Of course, individual-use disclosure, when feasible, is the best way to minimise the optimism effect. 
But even individualised disclosure is not a perfect cure for optimism. Individualised disclosure is based 
on historic information. An optimistic consumer might convince him or herself that she will not repeat the 
mistakes of the past. For example, a consumer who is confronted with information about the amount of late 
fees that he or she paid over the past year might refrain from switching to a credit card with lower late fees 
because he or she optimistically believes that he or she will not be late next year.
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of consumers will again opt for rebate pricing. The redemption rate will then drop back 
to 5%, the disclosure will be updated again and so forth. This dynamic is undesirable. 
But the endogeneity problem will often be mitigated by market forces. In the rebates 
example, if a seller expects that after disclosing the 5% redemption rate only highly 
motivated rebate users will prefer rebate pricing, it will have to reduce the magnitude of 
the rebate signifi cantly to avoid a loss. Accordingly, the seller will be able to advertise a 
90% redemption rate only for minor rebates.136
3.6.4 Voluntarily-Supplied Use-Pattern Information
A cost-benefi t analysis of any use-pattern disclosure mandate should consider the use-
pattern information that is being voluntarily provided in the marketplace. The benefi t of 
a disclosure mandate will generally be smaller when use-pattern information is already 
available.137 And this smaller benefi t may no longer justify the cost of the disclosure 
regulation. Use-pattern information is voluntarily provided by sellers and by third 
parties in some cases. For example, sellers routinely provide proper-use information, 
even absent a legal mandate. Tobacco companies voluntarily disclose tar and nicotine 
levels. Utility companies, cell phone service providers, credit card issuers and other 
sellers provide some use information on the monthly bill. Amazon and Netfl ix compile 
use-pattern information and use it to inform consumers about books and movies enjoyed 
by other consumers with similar use patterns. And more.
 Use-pattern information is also provided by third parties, like Consumer Reports 
and CNet.com. For example, Consumer Reports provides proper-use information about 
child car seats, lawnmowers and many other products.138 And CNet.com provides use 
information and Total Cost of Ownership information on home printing, for example.139 
When information is provided by the market – by sellers or by third parties – the need 
for disclosure regulation is diminished. The problem, of course, is that the market will 
not always provide suffi cient information. When buyers understand the extent and cost 
of their ignorance, they will become informed or generate demand for information that 
would motivate both sellers and third parties to provide this information. But buyers are 
not always aware of their ignorance (or of the cost of their ignorance). And, absent such 
rational demand for information, the imperfect alignment between seller interests, and 
even third-party interests, and consumer interests might lead to failure in the market for 
information.140 When such a market failure exists, disclosure regulation may be socially 
desirable.
136 Health club subscriptions provide another example. Assume that the average consumer who purchases 
a health club subscription attends the club ten times a year. If this information is disclosed, and if this 
disclosure is effective, many consumers who previously purchased a subscription will now choose the per-
visit pricing option, and only heavy users will purchase a subscription. Accordingly, the average attendance 
of a subscription holder would rise to, say, fi fty visits a year. The health club would have to update its 
disclosure. And there is a risk that with the new disclosure consumers will again opt for a subscription. Of 
course, if they do, then the disclosure will need to be updated again: back to an average attendance of ten 
times a year. Again market forces mitigate the problem. If, following the initial disclosure, only heavy users 
purchase subscriptions, then the subscription price will increase signifi cantly. And this increased price will 
minimise the number of light users who opt for a subscription, even when the disclosure is updated to the 
new fi fty visits per year average.
137 We assume that anti-fraud law effectively polices the accuracy of the voluntarily disclosed use-pattern 
information.
138 See ConsumerReports.org, ‘Buying Advice: Child Car and Booster Seats’, available at: <http://www.
consumerreports.org/cro/babies-kids/child-car-booster-seats/reports/how-to-choose/index.htm> (last 
visited 8 August 2007) (child car seats); ConsumerReports.org, ‘Equipment Care’, available at: <http://
www.consumerreports.org/cro/home-garden/news/october-2006/end-of-season-lawn-and-equipment-
guide-10-06/equipment-care/0610_end-of-season-lawn-and-equipment-guide_equipment-care.htm> (last 
visited 8 August 2007) (lawnmowers).
139 See CNet.com, ‘Printer Buying Guide’, available at: <http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-7604_7-1016838-
5.html?tag=tnav> (last visited 8 August 2007).
140 See also above Section 2.2.2.
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3.6.5 The Costs and Limits of Disclosure – Summary
Disclosure regulation is only partially effective, and its limited benefi ts are often offset 
by countervailing costs. This article is not a call for expanded disclosure. Rather, it 
argues that, within the vast landscape of disclosure regulation, too little attention has 
been paid to use-pattern disclosure.141 Accordingly, the implications of our analysis are 
not necessarily more disclosure. In many markets, applying the analysis developed in 
this article will require substituting some product attribute disclosure with use-pattern 
disclosure or modifying existing use-pattern disclosures. To the extent that disclosure 
regulation is socially desirable, the goal is to design the best possible disclosure regime. 
This regime will feature an optimal mix of product attribute disclosures and use-pattern 
disclosures.
 Most importantly, the cost-benefi t analysis that should guide regulators in designing 
an optimal disclosure regime must be a market-specifi c analysis. Only an in-depth 
inquiry into the specifi c market can identify a behavioural market failure – a persistent 
consumer mistake that causes substantial welfare loss. And only an in-depth market-
specifi c analysis can determine the optimal regulatory response to the identifi ed market 
failure. This article establishes the framework for identifying use-pattern mistakes and 
for designing a disclosure-based regulatory response to use-pattern mistakes. Applying 
this framework to specifi c consumer markets must be left for future research.142
4 Conclusion
Before purchasing a product, the consumer forms a mental image of how he or she 
will use the product. This image is not always accurate. Mistakes in estimating product 
use affect the perceived benefi ts and costs associated with a product and can lead 
to welfare-reducing transactions. The law plays an important role in facilitating the 
effi cient operation of markets by requiring disclosure of information that minimises 
consumer mistakes. And when the problem is use-pattern mistakes, the cure must be 
use-pattern disclosure. Existing use-pattern disclosures are largely confi ned to proper-
use information and to average-use information, indirectly disclosed as a benchmark for 
product attribute disclosures. Policy-makers should consider increasing the number and 
quality of use-pattern disclosure requirements. In particular, disclosure of individual-use 
information should be considered in markets characterised by long-term relationships 
between sellers and consumers.
 While this article focuses on disclosure regulation as a policy response to use-pattern 
mistakes, other, structural responses should be considered when applying the proposed 
framework to specifi c consumer markets. In particular, legal intervention establishing 
a time-limited consumer right to return a product or discontinue a service provides 
another regulatory response tailored to the unique characteristics of use-pattern mistakes. 
Ideally, after using the product or service for a period of time, the consumer will learn 
the necessary use-pattern information and will be better equipped to choose among 
competing products.143
141 As the preceding discussion makes clear, the costs and limits of disclosure affect both product attribute 
disclosures and use-pattern disclosures.
142 In theory, the call for a market-specifi c analysis invokes the problem of defi ning the relevant market. 
While the market-defi nition problem is a major problem in antitrust law, it should not pose a signifi cant 
hurdle in the present consumer protection context. At the very least, there is a suffi ciently large number 
of consumer markets where the proposed framework can be fruitfully applied without bumping against 
boundary questions of market defi nition. And, in many contexts, regulators should be able to base their 
policy analysis on a largely uncontroversial market defi nition that is functionally based on the identifi ed 
objectionable design feature.
143 Of course, the details of such a policy will have to be worked out on a market-by-market basis. 
Moreover, the policy will be inapplicable in many markets. Still, the structural connection of this policy 
to use-pattern mistakes and the potentially small burden it imposes on the operation of markets justify 
its consideration by policy-makers. Compare Camerer et al., above note 2 (noting cool-off periods as an 
example of asymmetrically paternalistic regulation).
